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THE ILLINOIS LAND TRUST:
A FICTIONAL BEST SELLER
Anthony Haswell*
Barbara B. Levine**
Land trusts have become an important aspect of property law in Illinois.
Although there is no definitive information regarding the extent to which
land trusts are used to hold title to Illinois real estate, it has been reported
that almost four out of every five parcels of land in Cook County have
been or are being held in land trusts.' The common use of the land trust
in Illinois, along with its unique legal characteristics, calls for a thorough
understanding of the complexities of this legal device.2
This article will discuss the basic characteristics of the land trust, par-
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1. Letter from Illinois Legislative Council to Rep. Peggy Smith Martin (May 10, 1973),
quoted in Legislative Note, Land Trust Secrecy-Perhaps a Secret No More, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 509, 516 n.38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Secret No More]; see H. KENOE, KENOE
ON LAND TRUSTS § 1.19, at 13 (1981 & Supp. 1983); Note, Is the Land Trust Truly a Trust?-
Gift Tax and Broader Implications, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 503 n.4 [hereinafter cited
as Note, Truly a Trust?]. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Chicago Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Cacciatore, 25 II1. 2d 535, 547, 185 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1962), commented that "millions,
and probably billions, of dollars have been and now are invested in similar trust arrangements
and thousands of titles depend thereon for their validity." Presently, over 550 banks and other
corporations in Illinois are authorized to administer trusts, and many handle only land trusts.
2. Out-of-state commentators' analyses of the so-called "Illinois" land trust generally have
been favorable. Most have recommended its adoption by their own state. E.g., Ard, A Pro-
posed Trust Code for Indiana-An Effort at Reform, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 427 (1970); Arn-
tson, The Virginia Land Trust-An Overlooked Title Holding Device for Investment, Business
and Estate Planning Purposes, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73 (1973); McKillop II, The Illinois
Land Trust in Florida, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 173 (1960); Resnick, Is There Such a Thing as
a California Land Trust?, 48 L.A. B. BULL. 216 (1973); Comment, A Device for Texas Land
Development: The Illinois Land Trust, 10 Hous. L. REV. 692 (1973); Comment, Land Trusts-
Adaptability to Kansas Real Estate Practice, 14 U. KAN. L. REv. 97 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Kansas Real Estate Practices]; Note, Land Trust Act, 18 MiAMs L. REV. 699
(1964); Note, North Dakota Land Trust, 45 N.D.L. REV. 77 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note,
North Dakota Land Trust]; Note, Land Trusts in New York, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Land Trusts in New York]; Note, "Illinois" Land Trusts in In-
diana, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 298 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, "Illinois" Land Trusts in In-
diana];Note, Land Trusts: Some Problems in Virginia, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 368 (1966);
see also Birnbaum & Monahan, The Nominee Trust in Massachusetts Real Estate Practice,
60 MASS. L.Q. 364 (1976) (discussion of Massachusetts nominee trust which has some of the
same advantages as the Illinois land trust).
Several states have adopted the land trust by statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-401
(1983) (disclosure only); FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 558 (1978);
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ticularly the relationship between the land trust trustee and beneficiary, the
trustee's immunity from certain forms of liability, and the characterization
of the beneficiary's interest as personalty. The last element, perhaps better
labeled the "personal property fiction," has been a key note in most land
trust decisions. This article reviews this personal property fiction in the areas
of creditor's bills, freehold jurisdiction, partition, judgment liens, the
beneficiary's contractual rights, collateral assignments of beneficial interests,
debtor and tax relief, property tax liability, due on sale clauses, and legislative
reaction to this fiction. Although there are valid reasons to choose a land
trust, it will be demonstrated that some of the advantages can be obtained
through other devices. The disadvantages the land trust arrangement imposes
upon both the beneficiary and the public require a reevaluation of its validity.
The article concludes with several proposals that will remedy some problems
associated with land trusts without eliminating the land trust as a property
arrangement.
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS
Absolute Ownership of Beneficiary
A typical Illinois land trust is a revocable inter vivos trust, the corpus
of which usually consists solely of real estate.3 In contrast to a conventional
trust, however, the Illinois land trust gives the beneficiary full and complete
control over the management, use, and disposition of the property, just as
if he" had legal title.' During the life of the land trust, the trustee can act
IND. CODE §13 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-02 (1967); VA. CODE § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1981).
Use of land trusts in states other than Illinois is not limited to the above states which have
enacted statutes. For an analysis of the duties which the various states impose upon the trustee
in order to create a valid land trust, see The American College of Probate Counsel, Validity
of Illinois Land Trusts (ACPC Study #15, 1981) (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as ACPC
Study]. Six states require no duty other than holding legal title to the property. Id. at 3-7.
The remainder require at least one duty other than holding legal title from the trustee. Id.
For example, seven states require that the trustee hold equitable, as well as legal title; 16 re-
quire a duty to convey the property at the request of the beneficiary; 13 require a duty to
sell property at the expiration of the trust; 24 require a duty to exercise discretion in manage-
ment of the property; 15 require a duty to collect rents and profits from the property; and
8 require a duty to take possession of the trust property. Id.
3. The land trust is "a trust in which corpus consists of real estate. ... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 791 (5th ed. 1979). In reality, however, this definition is somewhat narrow because
a land trust frequently consists of property such as leaseholds, improvements, and "personal
property used in connection with the operation of the real estate." H. KENOE, supra note 1,
§ 1.3, at 5. The land trust in Illinois has been adopted and developed by the judiciary, not
the legislature. See Note, North Dakota Land Trust, supra note 2, at 78.
4. Throughout this article, the authors use the personal pronoun "he" to refer to
"beneficiary" and "it" to refer to "trustee." This choice is made for clarity and brevity, and
is not meant to imply gender discrimination.
5. The beneficiary of a land trust collects rent or proceeds from sale or mortgage, im-
proves and operates the property, and exercises all other rights of ownership. See Southeast
Village Assocs. v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 810, 812, 416 N.E.2d 325,
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only upon the direction of the beneficiary.6 The trustee's role is thus re-
duced to that of a nominee or bare legal titleholder. Unlike the conven-
tional trust, in which the traditional objective is to confine the power of
the beneficiary and to deprive him of any right to manage and dispose of
the trust,7 the beneficiary of a land trust, is in essence, the true owner of
the property.'
The trustee of a land trust is equivalent to the agent of the beneficiary,9
because the trustee can legally bind the beneficiary when, and to the extent
that, the trustee acts on a valid exercise of the beneficiary's power of direc-
tion. It is not the power of direction per se which creates the agency; rather,
the agency is created by the beneficiary's retention of control over the trustee
327 (1st Dist. 1981); Robinson v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 32 Ill. App. 2d 55, 58, 176 N.E.2d
659, 661 (1st Dist. 1961). The roles of the beneficiary and trustee are best described as follows:
In a Land Trust the beneficiaries retain complete control over the real estate. They
manage it or they may employ agents to manage it for them. They collect and
distribute the income. They insure, develop, finance and direct the lease or sale
of the property as they see fit. They may terminate the trust at any time or add
property located anywhere in Illinois to the trust when they wish. Exclusive and
full power in all such matters rests with them.
The Trustee executes deeds, mortgages and leases and otherwise deals with the
title only upon written direction.
CHICAGO TITLE & TRUST Co., How A LAND TRUST SERVES THE REAL ESTATE OWNER 2-3
(1981) [hereinafter cited as LAND TRUST].
6. The trustee deals with the property only at the written direction of the beneficiary.
The trustee must comply with any such direction, and need not inquire as to the propriety
thereof. The only other duty the trustee has is to sell, at public auction, any property remain-
ing in the trust at its termination. Land trusts are typically terminated after twenty years. The
trustee is not required to pay taxes, obtain insurance on the property, or share in the respon-
sibility for any litigation. The beneficiary pays the trustee a fee for holding legal title and
reimburses the trustee for any expenses incurred in holding the title. Robinson, 32 11. App.
2d at 58, 176 N.E.2d at 661.
The unique arrangement between the trustee and beneficiary is created through the use of
two instruments. The deed in trust, which conveys the legal title of the realty to the trustee,
is filed for record as evidence of the trustee's title to the property. It does not identify the
beneficiary nor describe the terms of the trust. The trust agreement, executed contemporaneously
with the deed in trust, outlines the right of the beneficiary to retain absolute control over
the property through the power of direction over the trustee, and his rights to possess, control,
manage, and receive all proceeds from the property. The trust agreement is not recorded and
is normally kept secret from the public. See Comment, The Illinois Land Trust and Nebraska
Law, 47 NEB. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Illinois Land Trust].
The land trust agreement also requires that sale of the trust property takes place within a specified
period of time. This requirement insulates the trust from operation of the Rule against
Perpetuities. See Note, Land Trusts in New York, supra note 2, at 125 n.12.
7. See Kilgore v. State Bank, 300 I11. App. 409, 416, 21 N.E.2d 9, 11 (3d Dist. 1939).
Looked at in a different light, a conventional trust allows a beneficiary to receive the benefits
of the property consituting the corpus of the trust, without placing upon him the burdens
of management. G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 373 (5th ed. 1973).
8. See People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 11. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540 (1979); LAND
TRUST, supra note 5, at 2-3.
9. See W. SELL, AGENCY § 23 (1975).
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and management of the business of the trust.'" Despite legal commentary
to the contrary, an agency relationship indeed exists between the trustee and
beneficiary of a land trust."
Because of its active beneficiary and passive trustee characteristics, a land
trust would appear to be vulnerable to execution by the Statute of Uses' 2
as a "dry" or "passive" trust. 13 The Illinois courts, however, liberally con-
struing the statute, have consistently held that even the minimal duties of
a land trust trustee are sufficient to constitute an "active" trust. The Statute
of Uses has thus been made inapplicable to Illinois land trusts.'4
Trustee's Immunity From Certain Forms of Liability
Another characteristic of a land trust is that the trustee is neither liable
for real estate taxes," nor for tortious'6 or statutory violations' 7 arising out
10. See Kessler v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 101 Il1. App. 3d 502, 505, 428 N.E.2d 608,
611 (1st Dist. 1981). In addition to recognizing that the beneficiary/trustee relationship creates
an agency, courts have held that notice to the trustee of litigation affecting the beneficiary's
interests constitutes notice to the beneficiary. Lipavsky v. 16th St. Bldg. Corp., 267 Ill. App.
85, 89 (1st Dist. 1932).
The power of direction, however, does not create apparent or implied authority to bind the
beneficiary beyond what the beneficiary specifically authorizes. See, e.g., Barkhausen v. Con-
tinental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 3 Ill. 2d 254, 120 N.E.2d 649 (1954) (beneficiary not
personally liable on trustee's assumption of mortgage indebtedness), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897
(1954); Robinson v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 32 I11. App. 2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 659 (1st Dist. 1961)
(trustee not beneficiary's agent for service of process).
11. One legal commentator has denied the existence of this agency relationship. H. KENOE,
supra note 1, § 1.22, at 18 (when a trustee acts at the direction of the beneficiary, he acts
as a principal for himself and not as an agent for the beneficiary).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 3 (1983). The Statute of Uses originated in England in 1536.
The statute provides that the equitable title of the beneficiary is to be converted into full legal
title immediately upon creation of the trust. As did many other states, Illinois imported the
statute from England. Illinois has adopted the English interpretation of the statute as not applying
to "active" trusts. R. POWELL, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.16 (1952).
13. In a passive trust, the trustee has either no duties at all or only the duty to perform
a mechanical or formal act, as opposed to a discretionary act. G. BOGERT, supra note 7, at 167-68.
14. See Conley v. Petersen, 25 II. 2d 271, 184 N.E.2d 888 (1962) (trust not invalid merely
because a single person was settlor, trustee, and life beneficiary at the time of its creation);
Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952) (trust considered active and not subject
to Statute of Uses because distribution and winding up remained for the trustee to do); Robin-
son v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 32 111. App. 2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 659 (1st Dist. 1961) ("Illinois
courts have construed the land trust as an active trust and therefore not affected by the Statute
of Uses"); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329,
20 N.E.2d 992 (1st Dist. 1939) (Statute of Uses not applicable because trustee has active duty
to make conveyances during the term of trust and to sell all real estate left in the trust at
its termination). But cf. Masters v. Smythe, 342 Il1. App. 185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (2d Dist. 1950)
(trust was merely a passive one by which the trustee acquired naked title).
15. Seee.g., Proviso Township High School Dist. v. Hynes, 84 Ill. 2d 229, 49 N.E.2d 276
(1980) (beneficial owner of property is liable for real estate taxes); People v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 75 111. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540 (1979) (liability for unpaid real estate taxes falls
upon beneficiary as true owner of property); Gamble v. People, 117 111. App. 3d 784, 454
N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1983) (land trust beneficiary is liable for full amount of tax lien).
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of the operation and maintenance of the trust property. Nonliability is a
corollary to the trustee's nominal status. The trustee has no liability because
it has no control over the management and operation of the property.' 8
Because of the trustee's minimal duties and limited exposure to liability, 9
16. See, e.g., Fields v. 6125 Indiana Ave. Apts., Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 55, 196 N.E.2d 485
(1st Dist. 1964) (trustee not liable for personal injuries resulting from condition of the premises
where the beneficiaries had the power to manage and control the property); Brazowski v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 280 Il1. App. 293 (1st Dist. 1935) (beneficiary liable for personal injury
caused by fence falling on plaintiff).
The insulation of the trustee from liability, however, is not absolute. The trustee must assert
its right to exoneration. If it does not, it may be found jointly liable with the beneficiary.
See King v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 64 Ill. App. 3d 335, 381 N.E.2d 356 (1st Dist. 1978) (trustee
found liable, along with beneficiaries, for damages resulting from fire in building).
17. See, e.g., Robinson v. Walker, 63 Ill. App. 2d 204, 211 N.E.2d 488 (1st Dist. 1965)
(liability for personal injuries under Dram Shop Act lies with beneficiary who has control over
property).
18. In appropriate cases, however, trustees may be liable in tort because their involvement
goes beyond that of a bare legal title holder. For example, some recent trust agreements recite
that the beneficiary agrees to comply with all building codes and ordinances. This implies an
active supervisory role on the part of the trustee to see that the beneficiary complies because
such an agreement is meaningless unless the trustee is involved, to some extent, in the manage-
ment of the property. This amounts to an indicia of trustee management and control.
From time to time the media have publicized slumlord abuses concealed by land trusts. In
response, trustees have answered that they periodically check on their land trust properties,
and if they find the property deteriorating, they resign as trustees. See Chicago Sun-Times,
July 12, 1966, at 30, col. 1 (remarks of William B. Higginbotham of the La Salle National
Bank land trust department). This suggests that plaintiffs in liability suits should question the
trustee in each case to determine its precise involvement in management of the property. In
Bianchi v. Western Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970),
a trustee was held liable because it was covered by the liability insurance policy carried on
the property. One commentator recommends inclusion of the land trust trustee as an additional
insured party in public liability policies. H. KENOE, supra note 1, §§ 3.11, at 3, 5.56, at 195.
Even in the absence of any role in the management and control of the property, the trustee
may be estopped to deny liability. The recorded deed in trust grants to the trustee full power
and authority to deal with the property in any and all ways that an owner might deal with
it. Because a recorded deed is constructive notice to all the world of its contents, see Rosehill
Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 I11. 11, 185 N.E.2d 170 (1933), the trustee holds itself out to
the public as the real owner of the property. Furthermore, the deed in trust clothes the trustee
vis-a-vis the public with sufficient power over the property to enable the trustee to bring an
eviction action. See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Windsor Amusement Co.,
288 Ill. App. 57, 5 N.E.2d 606 (1st Dist. 1936). It follows that an injured member of the
public is entitled to rely upon the trustee's recorded assertion of ownership and control. Thus,
the trustee should be estopped from appearing in court to claim that it is only a bare legal
title holder. But cf. Trust Co. v. Sutherland Hotel Co., 389 I11. 67, 58 N.E.2d 860 (1945)
(ownership of record not sufficient to establish management and control when property was
under long-term lease).
19. The trustee's liablity for negligent or fraudulent administration of the trust remains,
however, and is a different matter altogether. See Lake City Corp. v. Michigan Ave. Nat'l
Bank, 33 111. App. 3d 100, 337 N.E.2d 251 (1st Dist. 1975); H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 2.31,
at 36. A transferee of the beneficiary, whether a grantee, assignee for collateral, or unsecured
lien creditor, acquires the beneficiary's rights against the trustee for breach of trust. See G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 188, 871 (1971); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 105 (1971).
Since recorded judgments, executions, and citations are constructive notice to the parties,
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a land trust trustee can charge a relatively low fee for its services." °
Secrecy of Beneficial Ownership
The recorded deed of a land trust does not identify the beneficiary.2 '
Rather, it identifies the trustee, the date of the trust's creation, and the
number of the trust.22 The trust agreement, which does identify the
beneficiary, is not recorded and normally is not available to the public. Since
the title is recorded in the name of the trustee, the beneficiary need not
record or disclose his interest in order to protect his property. Working
through brokers, the beneficiary can purchase and resell the property without
revealing his identity to a vendor or vendee. If a lender is willing to look
exclusively to the real estate as security for the loan and to forego personal
liability against the beneficiary, the beneficiary can obtain financing without
disclosing his identity.23
Beneficiary's Interest as Personalty
The interest of a beneficiary in a land trust is specifically described in
the trust documents as personal property. These documents provide that both
the legal and equitable title to the real estate lie with the trustee.2" These
their privies, and third persons, 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 133 (1947), a trustee is on constructive
notice of such matters as they affect beneficiaries. A trustee with notice of beneficial interest
assignment is liable for a breach of trust if it subsequently conveys the property to a bonafide
purchaser or otherwise fails to protect the position of the assignee. See Alcoa Bldg. Products,
Inc. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 62 Ill. App. 3d 510, 514, 379 N.E.2d 66, 69 (1st Dist. 1978);
Lake City Corp., 33 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 337 N.E.2d at 255. Additionally, a transferee of
the beneficiary may have a cause of action against the trustee apart from breach of trust.
See Oak Brook Bank v. Hawthorne Bank, 90 I11. App. 3d 642, 413 N.E.2d 491 (2d Dist.
1980) (impairment of capital); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 60 (1970) (conversion); I ILLINoIs LAW
AND PRACTICE Agency § 184 (1953) (conversion).
20. See G. BOGERT, supra note 7, at 513 (in deciding what is reasonable compensation for
trustee, court will consider the trustee's responsibility, risk, character of work done and other
relevant factors).
21. See Turner, Some Legal Aspects of Beneficial Interests Under Illinois Land Trusts, 39
ILL. L. REV. 216, 219 (1945); Comment, May the Beneficiary of an Illinois Land Trust Proceed
Under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act?, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 567, 568 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Beneficiary]; Note, Secret No More, supra note 1, at 510; Feature,
The Illinois Land Trust-Shroud with a Silver Lining?, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 412, 426 (1974).
One commentator noted that even though land trusts are not always secret, there are many
legitimate reasons to insulate real estate ownership from the public. Id.
22. See People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 I1. 2d 479, 487, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543
(1979); H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3.
23. See Comment, Illinois Land Trust, supra note 6, at 105.
24. The following is a typical deed in trust provision for the conversion of the beneficiary's
interest from real property to personal property:
The interest of each beneficiary under the trust agreement and of all persons claim-
ing under them or any of them shall be only in the possession, earnings and the
avails and proceeds arising from the sale, mortgage or other disposition of the real
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representations have been given effect on numerous occasions by the Illinois
courts.2" In contrast to a land trust, in a conventional trust where the cor-
pus is real estate, the interest of the beneficiary is considered personal prop-
erty only if his interest is limited to the earnings and proceeds of sale and
if the trustee retains effective dominion and control over the property.2" A
beneficiary of a land trust, therefore, obtains some of the legal attributes
of a personal property interest while retaining absolute ownership and con-
trol of his real estate.27
Despite the unusual relationship between the trustee and beneficiary, the
land trust is still a trust, and as such is still subject to the laws and legal
principles generally applicable to trusts.28 As the Illinois Supreme Court stated
in Schumann-Heink v. Folsom,29 "[b]ecause a new use is being made of
the trust does not mean new principles of law are to be applied in determin-
estate, and such interest is hereby declared to be personal property, and no beneficiary
shall have any title or interest, legal or equitable, in or to the real estate as such,
but only an interest in the possession, earnings, avails and proceeds thereof as
aforesaid.
H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 6. Similarly, a typical trust agreement refers to the per-
sonal property designation in the following manner:
[T]he interest of any beneficiary hereunder shall consist solely of a power of direc-
tion to deal with the title to said property ... as hereinafter provided, and the
right to receive the proceeds from rentals and from mortgages, sales or other disposi-
tion of said premises, and that such right in the avails of said property shall be
deemed to be personal property, and may be assigned and transferred as such;
S.. and that no beneficiary ... hereunder at any time shall have any right, title
or interest in or to any portion of said real estate as such, either legal or equitable,
but only an interest in the earnings, avails and proceeds as aforesaid.
Id. § 2.3, at 11.
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Alpert, 95 Ill. 2d 377, 447 N.E.2d 796 (1983) (husband's
and wife's joint tenancy real estate which was held in trust described as personal property);
Chicago Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 I11. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962) (single
family residence placed in trust was described as personal property); First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 I11. App. 3d 54, 389 N.E.2d 652 (2d Dist. 1979) (condominium unit held
in land trust described as personal property in an action to determine priority between judg-
ment creditors); Hutter v. Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank, 54 Ill. App. 3d 653, 370 N.E.2d
47 (lst Dist. 1977) (homestead held in trust described as personal property in an action for
accounting and damages); see infra notes 57-175 and accompanying text.
26. G. BOGERT, supra note 7, at 135. Otherwise, the interest of the beneficiary in a conven-
tional real estate trust is an interest in real estate. See Gordon v. Gordon, 6 II1. 2d 572, 129
N.E.2d 706 (1955).
27. See People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 111. 2d 479, 488, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543
(1979) (although beneficiary's interest is described as personal property, all attributes of owner-
ship remain with him except the holding of title).
28. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982);
cf. Britton v. Winger, 110 111. App. 3d 230, 442 N.E.2d 264 (4th Dist. 1982) (trustee may
purchase trust property if it has no control over the sale, provided the beneficiary is fully
informed of all facts in connection with the sale); Ford City Bank & Trust Co. v. Ford City
Bank & Trust Co., 110 111. App. 3d 123, 441 N.E.2d 1192 (1st Dist. 1982) (breach of duty
for trustee to purchase its trust property for its own account).
29. 328 111. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927).
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ing the rights of the trustees, the cestuis que trust or persons dealing with
the trustees." 3
WHY CHOOSE A LAND TRUST?
Secrecy
The popularity and the notoriety of land trusts can be attributed primarily
to the benefits derived from secrecy of ownership." Secret ownership, for
example, provides financial privacy for the beneficiary who may not want
to disclose the extent of his real estate holdings.32 Furthermore, if he is a
landlord, the land trust arrangement helps him to avoid the inconvenience
and annoyance of dealing directly with tenants.33 Additionally, secrecy of
ownership can facilitate the purchase of large tracts of land for develop-
ment at lower prices than might be demanded if the buyer's identity were
known.34 Finally, secrecy of ownership helps to insulate the trust property
from creditors, especially attachment creditors."
The secrecy of beneficial ownership is not unique to land trusts. Indeed,
many kinds of conventional trusts provide for secrecy. In a more conven-
tional trust, however, the beneficiary relinquishes a significant degree of con-
trol over the property and must pay the trustee a substantial fee for both
performance of its duties and its exposure to potential liability. Low trustee
fees and the beneficiary's retention of absolute control and management of
30. Folsom, 328 Ill. at 327, 159 N.E. at 252; see also Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982) (land trusts are to be treated the same as any
other trust insofar as the relationship of trustee and beneficiary is concerned).
31. See Lambos v. Lambos, 9 Ill. App. 3d 530, 534, 292 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1st Dist. 1972)
(advantage of land trust seen as the ability to enjoy proceeds of land anonymously without
the inconvenience of being holder of record title); H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5.
32. H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5; see also De Witt, The Illinois Land Trust-Its
Undeveloped Potential in California, 41 L.A. B. BULL. 20, 22 (1965) (secrecy prevents public
scrutiny of assets); Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1, at 510 (secrecy insures privacy of
beneficiary's interest, akin to privacy surrounding bank accounts and corporate stock holdings).
But see Comment, Illinois Land Trust, supra note 6, at 104 n.16. The author states, "This
privacy may be illusory, at least for the initial period after the land is placed in trust by the
owner who became beneficiary. The astute title-searcher will, of course, be able to see who
put the land into the trust, and who is presumably still the owner."
33. H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5; see, e.g., Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1,
at 509; Katz, Why We Favored Limited Bill on Secret Land Trusts, Chicago Sun-Times, May
30, 1980, at 40, col. 1; Hearing on S. 1090 Before the Illinois State Senate Judiciary Comm.,
83d Gen. Assembly (May 3, 1983) (testimony of William R. Dillon, Corporate Fiduciaries of
Illinois).
34. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5; LAND TRUST, supra note 5, at 3. Subsequent
purchase negotiations can sometimes be handled more economically when the identity of the
purchaser is unknown because a seller might increase his price if he knows that the purchaser
is wealthy or that the land is vital to the completion of a tract. See DeWitt, supra note 32,
at 22; Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1, at 509; Note, "Illinois" Land Trusts in Indiana,
supra note 2, at 300.
35. Anderson, Land Trusts in Action, REAL ESTATE NEWS, Feb. 25, Mar. 4, Mar. 11, 1955;
The New Vrdolyak, Chicago Lawyer, May 1982, at 7, col. 2.
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the property have made land trusts the preferred device in Illinois to achieve
secrecy of ownership.
Other Advantages for Real Estate Owners
Other advantages of land trusts, besides secrecy, help to account for the
popularity of land trusts among real estate owners. Because the recorded
legal title is separated from the beneficial interest, a land trust arrangement
facilitates voluntary transfers of the property, including tax-free exchanges,
through simple assignment36 of the beneficial interest rather than by deed.
As a result, when the beneficial interest is transferred, the record title is
not disturbed, liability for real estate transfer taxes is avoided,37 reassess-
ment for property tax purposes is delayed,3" and the expense incurred in
recordation and the purchase of new title insurance is circumvented.
When real estate is owned by a number of different persons, conveyance
of title is simpler if the property is held in a land trust. Signatures on con-
veyances need not be obtained from, nor title searches made on, the in-
dividual owners. Also, a land trust prevents impairment of the legal title
through involuntary transfers by, or liens against, beneficiaries, thus assur-
ing that the legal title is insulated from bankruptcy, insanity, death,
judgments, litigation, or marital disputes involving the individual beneficial
owners.39 This protection can be important in large development projects,
where such impairment could be fatal to the successful completion of a
project.4" Use of the land trust is also advantageous in land syndication ar-
rangements because it permits syndications to avoid the double taxation of
corporate income, which is taxed first to the corporation and then, on
distribution of dividends, to the shareholders."
Land trusts can help prevent wrongful conveyances of the real estate title
by individual partners and other multiple owners not authorized to make
conveyances, as well as by real estate contract sellers in fraud of the rights
36. See Kortenhof v. Messick, 18 Ill. App. 3d 1, 309 N.E.2d 368 (1st Dist. 1974); Com-
ment, Beneficiary, supra note 21, at 569.
37. The Real Estate Transfer Tax Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 1003 (1983), imposes
a transfer tax of 25¢ per $500 value of real estate which is transferred by deed filed for record.
Because an assignment of a land trust beneficial interest is not a deed and is not filed for
record, a beneficial interest transfer is not subject to the act. The City of Chicago real estate
transfer tax, CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 200.1-2B (1980), is more ambiguous. Since it was enacted
in 1973, however, the city has made no attempt to collect the tax on beneficial interest
assignments. See H. KENOE, supra note I, § 7.5, at 10.
38. H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 4.
39. Id. § 1.9, at 10; see Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1, at 510.
40. H. KENOE, supra note I, § 1.9, at 10.
41. See Schwind, Land Trusts: A Real Estate Syndication Device, 101 TRS. & ESTS. 650
(1962); Comment, Illinois Land Trust, supra note 6, at 105; Note, Land Trust in New York,
supra note 2, at 126-28. If the particular land trust arrangement gives the trustee more than
ministerial duties, it risks classification as a taxable association. H. KENOE, supra note 1, §§
7.22, at 23, 7.26, at 27-28; Turner, supra note 21, at 242; Comment, Kansas Real Estate Prac-
tices, supra note 2, at 100-01.
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of the purchaser. Additionally, partition proceedings may not be available
to the beneficiaries of a land trust."2 Land development programs benefit
by avoiding time-consuming and expensive partition litigation that might result
from dissension among multiple beneficiaries.
Land trusts with designated remainder beneficiaries may be used as
substitutes for wills in the testamentary disposition of property, and are not
invalid for failure to comply with the Statute of Wills. 3 Therefore, prop-
erty over which the owner retains absolute control before death may be kept
out of his probate estate after death. Also, land trusts can be used to avoid
probate, as well as ancillary administration of real estate, owned by
nonresidents or owned by residents in other states." Furthermore, the real
estate of a land trust beneficiary can be insulated from claims of a surviving
spouse."' Finally, a land trust may facilitate minimization of estate and gift
taxes by inter vivos transfers of the beneficiary's interest."
A land trust also provides advantageous methods of obtaining loans or
financing. A mortgage loan can be obtained using the legal title to the real
estate as the sole security without imposing personal liability on the
beneficiary. 7 Alternatively, the beneficial interest, rather than the real estate,
may be used as security for the loan. Because this arrangement involves the
42. As a general rule, partition proceedings are not available to land trust beneficiaries.
See, e.g., Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952) (dismissal of action for partition
among beneficiaries of land trust in which the corpus consisted of an apartment building);
Aronson v. Olsen, 348 Ill. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932) (proceeding for dissolution of partnership,
partition, and accounting remanded with directions to dismiss partition action in a land trust
arrangement); DeWitt, supra note 32, at 22; Comment, Illinois Land Trust, supra note 6, at
103; Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1, at 510; infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
43. See Conley v. Petersen, 25 111. 2d 271, 184 N.E.2d 888 (1962); H. KENOE, supra note
1, § 7.40, at 42-43.
44. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 12; Comment, Illinois Land Trust, supra note
6, at 103; Note, Truly a Trust?, supra note 1, at 511.
45. See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73 111. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978); In re
Estate of Nemecek, 85 Ill. App. 3d 881, 407 N.E.2d 655 (1st Dist. 1980); Lesnik v. Estate
of Lesnik, 82 Il. App. 3d 1102, 401 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist. 1980); Payne v. River Forest
State Bank, 81 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 401 N.E.2d 1299 (1st Dist. 1980); Elliott v. Alexson, 33
Ill. App. 3d 1046, 339 N.E.2d 378 (1st Dist. 1975). Other decisions point out, however, that
when the settlor of the trust retains the power of direction, there is not a completed inter
vivos gift. See Caleca v. Caleca, 63 Ill. App. 3d 414, 380 N.E.2d 493 (3d Dist. 1978); Rudolph
v. Gersten, 100 Ill. App. 2d 253, 241 N.E.2d 600 (1st Dist. 1968).
46. Land trust interests can be considered valid gifts and are subject to the Federal Gift
Tax Act, I.R.C. § 250 (1982). To qualify for an estate tax exclusion for the value of the gift,
the assignment of the beneficial interest must be such that the donor retains no control over
the interest. See Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1942); Estate of Mc Clure,
608 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Wolff, Qualifying Gifts of Fractional Shares of Illinois Land
Trusts, 14 J. MAR. L. REv. 717, 732 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Barkhausen v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 3 Ill. 2d 254, 270, 120 N.E.2d
649, 658 (1954) (beneficiary was not personally liable for the assumption of mortgage indebtedness
when he did not specifically authorize the trustee to so obligate him); Lowenstein v. Chicago
Title, 340 Ill. App. 160, 163, 91 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1st Dist. 1950) (sole remedy is foreclosure
under trust deed when notes so provide); Conkling v. McIntosh, 324 Il. App. 292, 297, 58
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pledging of personal, not real, property, the transaction is not subject to
the mortgagor's rights of judicial foreclosure or redemption. 4 1
Lastly, some real estate owners favor the land trust because it provides
immunity from judgment liens. Illinois law provides that judgment liens can
only attach to real estate interests.41 A judgment against a land trust
beneficiary does not create a lien on the real estate title that comprises the
corpus of the trust,5" and such a judgment has been held not to create a
lien on the beneficial interest.'
TiH PERSONAL PROPERTY FICTION-HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
The representations in land trust documents that the interest of the
beneficiary is personal property, and that the beneficiary has no equitable
title or interest in the real estate are wholly fictional. Professor Henry W.
Kenoe, a leading commentator on land trusts, has characterized them as
agreements to call a dog a cat. 2 In his article, Kenoe referred to the follow-
ing description of the personal property fiction:
Alice sat across from the desk of a large white rabbit in the Land Trust
Department at the Wonderland Trust Company. "Mr. Bunny," she said,
"since the real estate which I hold is now in a land trust with your com-
pany, I should like to review with you, as the trust officer in charge, my
duties as a landlord; and I want you to tell me how to have the leases
signed."
"Well, young lady," said Mr. Bunny, "as a preliminary matter, let me
dispose of a misunderstanding on your part. You no longer hold the real
estate. We do. The deed which you gave to us clearly states that
Wonderland Trust Company has all of the legal and equitable title in the
property which was once yours." And then noting Alice's rising alarm,
he continued: "But do not be afraid for we can do nothing with the prop-
erty except upon your written direction, it says so right in the Trust
Agreement."
Alice's fears seemed to subside, but Mr. Bunny continued to reassure
her. "Besides you are entitled to the management and control of the prop-
erty and to the rents, issues, proceeds and avails. That too is right here
in the Trust Agreement."
"That sounds like a schizophrenic arrangement to me" said Alice. "Oh
N.E.2d 304, 305 (1st Dist. 1944) (when trust deed provides that only security is the real estate
and that no personal liability will result, in case of default the sole remedy is foreclosure on
trust deed); see also H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 10.
48. H. KENOE, supra note I, § 5.34, at 139-41.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 12-101, -105 (1983).
50. See Chicago Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670
(1962); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Il. App. 329, 20
N.E.2d 992 (lst Dist. 1939).
51. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 Ill. App. 3d 543, 389 N.E.2d 652
(2d Dist. 1979); Sterling Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schultz, 71 111. App. 2d 94, 218 N.E.2d 53
(1st Dist. 1966); see also infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
52. Kenoe, Land Trust Financing and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 Cm. B. REC.
419, 421 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kenoe, Land Trust Financing].
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
no" said Mr. Bunny, "we have finally achieved the goal of the
Philosophers. We have now separated Pure Form from Pure Substance." 3
Illinois courts have noted the fictional nature of the personal property
designation of the beneficiary's interest. In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that land trusts are a fiction under which the beneficiary has "what
is referred to as a personal property interest [while in fact having] most of
the usual attributes of real property ownership." 54 More recently, the court
noted the "paradoxical characterization of the beneficiary's interest as per-
sonal property, although the subject of the trust is realty.""5 An appellate
court once referred to "the make-believe which hovers over land trusts."
56
Given the fictional nature of these personal property representations, an
inquiry must be made into whether the use of this fiction promotes justice
and sound public policy. It is the authors' contention that it does not. The
examination of Illinois case law which follows indicates that the validity of
this personal property designation is diminishing. The fiction seems parti-
cularly inappropriate in land trust cases in which third parties assert valid
claims based upon the true nature of the beneficial interest as real estate.
Creditor's Bills
The earliest case commonly cited for the proposition that the beneficial
interest in a land trust is personal property is Kerr v. Kotz. " In Kerr, the
beneficiary argued that his interest was real estate, and therefore, not reach-
able by a creditor's bill, a remedy used by creditors to reach personal property
of the debtor. The court held, however, that the representation in the trust
documents that the beneficiary's interest was personal property was suffi-
cient to subject this interest to a creditor's bill."
Rather than characterize the interest of a land trust beneficiary as per-
53. Alice Revisited, 41 CHI. B. REC. 195 (1960); see Kenoe, Land Trust Financing, supra
note 52, at 419 n.3.
54. People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 488, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1979);
see also Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 123 Ill App. 3d 282, 286,
462 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1st Dist. 1984) (land trust is a "legal fiction").
55. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 238, 432 N.E.2d 841, 845 (1982).
56. Madigan v. Buehr, 125 Ill. App. 2d 8, 17, 260 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1st Dist. 1970); see
also Jacobs v. Carroll, 46 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79-80, 360 N.E.2d 136, 139 (2d Dist. 1977) (quoting
Madigan).
57. 218 11. App. 654 (1st Dist. 1920) (abstract opinion). Although the court did not discuss
the matter, it may be argued that, since the beneficiary was in partnership, his interest was
personal property by operation of partnership law regardless of the terms of the trust. But
see Berning v. Berning, 320 Ill. App. 686, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 1943) (abstract opinion)
(in the face of a creditor's bill, the beneficiary was bound by the personal property recitations).
58. Kerr, 218 Ill. App. at 654. The creditor's bill is now rarely used in Illinois. An equivalent
remedy is included in the supplementary citation proceedings statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 2-1402(a) (1983).
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sonalty, the court should have based its decision in Kerr upon a theory of
estoppel. Once the beneficiary has agreed with the trustee to label his in-
terest personal property, he should be estopped from later asserting that he
owns real estate. Such an assertion is in essence an effort to defeat a creditor
who, in reliance upon the beneficiary's representation, has selected a remedy
applicable to personal property." The person who calls his dog a cat must
be consistent; he cannot later change his position and assert that it really
is a dog to the prejudice of one who relied upon the characterization of
it as a cat.6"
Freehold Jurisdiction
The personal property fiction has been invoked by the Illinois Supreme
Court in several cases, beginning with Duncanson v. Lill,6 under the scope
of its former freehold jurisdiction.62 The Duncanson court held that a land
trust beneficiary did not own a freehold because he owned only a personal
59. The Illinois Supreme Court has provided the following definition of estoppel:
[Wihere a party by his statements or conduct leads another to do something he
would not have done but for the statements or conduct of the other, the one guilty
of the expressions or conduct will not be allowed to deny his utterances or acts
to the loss or damage of the other party. The party claiming the estoppel must
have relied upon the acts or representations of the other and have had no knowledge
or convenient means of knowing the true facts.
Dill v. Widman, 413 Il. 448, 455-56, 109 N.E.2d 765, 769 (1953). It may be argued that
the requirement of justifiable reliance was not met in Kerr and Berning because the unrecorded
trust agreements disclosed that the true interest of the beneficiaries was an interest in real estate.
An unsecured creditor is not, however, likely to have access-and presumably did not have
such access-to the trust agreement before initiating proceedings to enforce the judgment. Hence,
the creditor can rely on the recorded deed in trust, which asserts that the beneficiary's interest
is personal property.
60. The most succinct recognition of estoppel in a land trust case appears in In re Application
of County Treasurer, 113 Ill. App. 2d 50, 251 N.E.2d 757 (1st Dist. 1969). The court denied
a land trust beneficiary the status of a party "interested in the real estate" who as such is
entitled to notice of an application for a tax deed, stating that beneficiaries "cannot be permit-
ted to adopt a legal entity and be blessed with both a sword and a shield depending upon
the various facts and circumstances." Id. at 57, 251 N.E.2d at 760-61.
In another case, land trust beneficiaries entered into a real estate sales contract which im-
plied that they owned legal title to the property they were selling. Rizakos v. Kekos, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 404, 371 N.E.2d 896 (1st Dist. 1977). The buyers assumed that the sellers could con-
vey title. Later, the sellers argued that since they were only land trust beneficiaries and did
not have legal title, the contract could not be enforced against them. The court held that the
beneficiaries were estopped from asserting that because they did not have title, they could not
convey the land. The court emphasized instead that the sellers had full power to direct the
trustee to convey it. Id.
61. 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
62. ILL. CoNST. of 1870. A freehold estate is "an estate for life or in fee." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 598 (5th ed. 1979). The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed, on direct appeal, cases
involving freehold estates. This provision was abolished by the 1964 Judicial Article included
in the Illinois Constitution adopted in 1970. ILL CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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property interest.6 3 The court, however, went on to describe the beneficiary's
interest as encompassing the "right to do what in equity would entitle the
party to a freehold,"" in other words, the right to direct the trustee to con-
vey the legal title to the beneficiary himself. This right is equivalent to an
equitable title to the real estate because a person entitled to the conveyance
of the legal title to real estate is the equitable owner.6 ' Thus, Ducanson was
correctly decided not because the beneficial interest was personal property,
but because an equitable right, title, or interest in real estate is not equivalent
to a freehold. 66
Partition,
In Aronson v. Olsen, 67 the Illinois Supreme Court denied multiple land
trust beneficiaries the right to sue for partition because the trust documents
asserted that their interests were personal property, which is not legally
partitionable. 6' The result is correct not because of the personal property
designation, but because the parties were partners.6 1 Partnership property
is not subject to partition unless the purposes of the partnership have been
63. Duncanson, 322 Ill. at 533, 153 N.E. at 620; see Seno v. Franke, 20 I11. 2d 70, 169
N.E.2d 335 (1960); Cohen v. Oguss, 384 Il. 353, 51 N.E.2d 461 (1943); Davis v. Oliver, 371
111. 287, 20 N.E.2d 582 (1939); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324 111. 319, 155 N.E. 323 (1927). But cf.
Korziuk v. Korziuk, 13 111. 2d 238, 148 N.E.2d 727 (1958) (beneficiaries considered to have
a real property interest in partnership real estate held in a land trust).
64. Duncanson, 322 Ill. at 534, 153 N.E. at 620.
65. See Harris v. Ingleside Bldg. Corp., 370 Ill. 617, 19 N.E.2d 585 (1939) (right to main-
tain an action for specific performance to convey the legal title to real estate is equivalent
to an equitable title in the real estate); cf. Johnson v. Filson, 118 111. 219, 223, 8 N.E. 318,
320 (1886) (exclusive control and possession of premises consititutes equitable title in real estate).
A land trust beneficiary has the absolute right at any time to direct the trustee to convey legal
title to himself or to anyone else he chooses. Hence, notwithstanding the representations to
the contrary in the trust agreement, the beneficiary, not the trustee, owns equitable title to
the real estate.
66. See Kirchoff v. Union Mut. Life Ins., 128 I11. 199, 204, 20 N.E. 808, 810 (1889).
67. 348 I11. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932). While it has been held that parties to a real estate
sales contract may agree that the buyer does not acquire equitable title until the final payment
is made, Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Ill. 2d 214, 193 N.E.2d 786 (1963), such an agreement does
not affect the state of facts as to the buyer's equitable title at the time he tenders final pay-
ment and demands a deed.
68. 348 Ill. at 28-29, 180 N.E.2d at 566; see also Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d
625 (1952). In Breen, it was determined that partition was not available after termination of
a trust equitably converted the beneficiaries' interest to personal property. Furthermore, the
beneficiaries were bound by the recitations in a trust, established for their benefit by their
parents, which provided that the property was not to be sold for less than $165,000, thereby
implying that it was not to be partitioned.
69. Although the trust agreement itself did not provide for a partnership, the opinion makes
clear that the trust property was, in fact, acquired and operated by the beneficiaries as part-
ners. Aronson, 348 111. at 29, 180 N.E. at 567. A later decision indicates that multiple beneficiaries
of land trusts are considered partners as a matter of law unless the facts indicate otherwise.
Harmon v. Martin, 395 111. 595, 71 N.E.2d 74 (1947).
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achieved,"0 or the partnership has been dissolved.7' It, therefore, appears that
in the absence of other circumstances, such as an ongoing partnership or
a valid equitable conversion, the trust agreement recitations that the
beneficiaries' interest is personalty are apparently insufficient to operate as
an agreement not to partition.7 2
Judgment Liens
a. Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Mercantile Trust & Savings
Bank
A judgment is a lien on an interest in real estate that is effective even
if the real estate interest is not recorded.73 The Illinois judgment lien statute
provides that the term "real estate" includes not only lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, but also all of the legal and equitable rights and interests
therein."4 It further defines mere leaseholds of over five years as interests
in real estate subject to judgment liens.7" Nevertheless, the Illinois courts
have consistently held that a judgment lien does not attach to a land trust
beneficial interest because such an interest is personal property.76
The Illinois Appellate Court laid the philosophical foundation for this
interpretation in Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Savings
Bank." In Chicago Title, the court held that a land trust is not executed
by the Statute of Uses.' Since the legal title, therefore, remains in the trustee,
a judgment creditor's lien against the beneficiary does not attach to the title
of the real estate.79 The court, however, was not content to simply hold
that the trustee had sufficient active duties to save the trust from the opera-
tion of the statute." It went on to hold that the Statute of Uses was also
70. Whitaker v. Scherrer, 313 I11.'473, 145 N.E. 177 (1924) (since land trust beneficiaries
were engaged in a joint venture to subdivide and sell the trust real estate, partition sought
by beneficiaries would be contrary to the purpose of the venture, and therefore, an agreement
not to partition would be implied).
71. Korziuk v. Korziuk, 13 Il. 2d 238, 148 N.E.2d 727 (1958).
72. See Gallagher v. Drovers Trust & Sav. Bank, 404 Ill. 410, 88 N.E.2d 870 (1949); Har-
rison v. Kamp, 395 I11. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946); see also Korziuk v. Korziuk, 13 111. 2d
238, 148 N.E.2d 727 (1958) (court allowed partition of land trust real estate without discussion
of personal property question).
73. See Niantic Bank v. Dennis, 37 111. 381 (1865).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-105 (1983).
75. Id.
76. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 123 111. App. 3d 282, 462 N.E.2d
741 (1st Dist. 1984); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 Ill. App. 3d 54, 389 N.E.2d
652 (2d Dist. 1979); Sterling Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schultz, 71 I11. App. 2d 94, 218 N.E.2d
53 (1st Dist. 1966).
77. 300 I11. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1st Dist. 1939).
78. Id. at 335, 20 N.E.2d at 996.
79. Id. at 336, 20 N.E.2d at 996.
80. Id. at 340, 20 N.E.2d at 997.
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inapplicable because the beneficiary's interest was personal property.' In
so doing, the court erred both in its interpretation of the Statute of Uses82
and in its analysis of the nature of the beneficiary's interest. 3
The court relied upon three bases for its holding: partnership law, the
doctrine of equitable conversion, and the trust agreement itself. Regarding
partnerships, the court correctly stated that "an agreement creating an in-
terest in the profits or proceeds of the sale of real estate creates no interest
in or lien upon the land itself."" This statement, however, does not describe
the property interest of a sole land trust beneficiary, such as the judgment
debtor in Chicago Title, who, because of the nature of the land trust, was
absolute owner of the real estate.
The court next asserted that under the doctrine of equitable conversion,
the beneficiary's interest was personal property because the trust agreement
required the trustee to sell the property and pay the proceeds to the
beneficiary twenty years after the commencement of the trust. 5 The court's
81. Id.
82. Under the Statute of Uses, determination of whether the trust is real or personal prop-
erty depends upon the nature of the res or corpus, not upon the beneficial interest. Kirkland
v. Cox, 94 Ill. 400, 412 (1880). The statutory language is clear that the property affected is
the property owned by the trustee for the use of the beneficiary. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 30, §
3 (1983). Furthermore, in the two cases cited by the court in Chicago Title, the corpus of
the trusts was personal property. See Smith v. Smith, 254 Ill. 488, 98 N.E. 950 (1912); Lord
v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N.E. 1012 (1909). The latter case involved the Rule in Shelly's
Case and not the Statute of Uses. Id. at 497, 88 N.E. at 1015. Hence, the court's conclusion
that the beneficial interest was personal property was irrelevant to the application of the Statute
of Uses.
83. Although not discussed in Chicago Title, there is language in decisions and commen-
taries which suggests that the interests of beneficiaries in "active" trusts are personal property,
and therefore, not subject to judgment liens. See Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296 (1891); Bran-
dies v. Cochrane, 112 U.S. 344 (1884); Moll v. Gardner, 214 111. 248, 73 N.E. 442 (1905);
Kratovil & Harrison, Jr., Enforcement of Judgments Against Real Property, 1951 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 20-21; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 526 (1924). These sources, however, deal with conventional trusts
in which the trustee has actual control over the real estate and the beneficiaries, who were
entitled only to the income, owned only a personal property interest. Under different cir-
cumstances, a trust may be sufficiently "active" to escape the Statute of Uses, while at the
same time the beneficiary's rights and interest may be sufficient to warrant finding he has
an equitable interest in the real estate. See Gordon v. Gordon, 6 Ill. 2d 572, 129 N.E.2d 706
(1955).
84. 300 Ill. App. at 336, 20 N.E.2d at 995.
85. Id. at 338, 20 N.E.2d at 996. The doctrine of equitable conversion is applied to wills
and conventional trusts which direct the executor or trustee to sell the real estate upon the
death of the testator or the termination of the trust, and divide the proceeds among the
devisees or remainder beneficiaries. See In re Estate of Krotzsch, 60 lll.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d
758 (1975); Keller v. Schobert, 58 11. 2d 137, 317 N.E.2d 510 (1974). From the creation of
the trust, the devisees or beneficiaries realize their interest in the form of money-in other
words, personal property-even though the parties have a legal right, if they all agree, to take
the real estate directly. See, e.g., 8930 S. Harlem, Ltd. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 2d 212, 396 N.E.2d
1 (1979); Keller v. Schobert, 58 111. 2d 137, 317 N.E.2d 510 (1974). The equitable conversion
doctrine is also applied in litigation involving real estate contracts. Unless the parties agree
otherwise, the buyer under an executory real estate sales contract is regarded as owning the
19841 ILLINOIS LAND TRUST
application of the doctrine is inappropriate for several reasons. First, an
equitable conversion does not take place as long as the beneficiary can dic-
tate the price for which the property is sold." Because the land trust
beneficiary has absolute control over the terms by which the property may
be sold during the twenty-year life of the land trust, the trustee has no power
to sell the real estate unless so directed by the beneficiary.7
Second, if the trustee's duty to sell is contingent upon an event that may
or may not occur, conversion does not take place until the event actually
occurs.8 Because the trustee's duty to sell the land trust real estate at the
termination of the trust is contingent upon the real estate remaining in the
trust at that time, conversion cannot take place until termination.
Third, equitable conversion does not occur if the trustee has the option
either to sell the real estate or to convey it in kind to the beneficiaries.8 9
Thus, equitable conversion is precluded by the land trust trustee's option
to resign at any time, and to convey the legal title to the beneficiary.9"
Finally, equitable conversion may be invoked only to effectuate the intent
of the testator or settlor9 ' Land trust settlors seldom intend that the prop-
erty remain in the trust until its termination, to be sold by the trustee.9 2
In the rare instances when the property does remain in the trust for the
duration, it is through the negligence or inadvertance of the trustee or
beneficiary. Accordingly, because it does not effectuate the intent of the
settlor, equitable conversion should not be applied to land trusts.
real estate while the seller has only a personal property interest in the sale proceeds, even though
the seller still has legal title and is owed money. See Shay v. Penrose, 25 Il. 2d 447, 185
N.E.2d 218 (1962); Hartman v. Hartman, 11 Ill. App. 3d 524, 297 N.E.2d 199 (1st Dist. 1973).
86. Hazlett v. Moore, 372 Ill. 192, 195, 23 N.E.2d 57, 58 (1939).
87. Cf. Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952), in which a trust agreement
resulted in a valid equitable conversion because the twenty years had passed. The trustee's
duty to sell "became imperative upon the expiration of the twenty year period." Id. at 213,
103 N.E.2d at 629.
The Chicago Title court asserted that the power of direction was merely a recitation of the
right of "reconversion" which would be accorded the beneficiary by operation of law even
if no mention was made in the trust agreement, and that the beneficial interest would not
be "reconverted" to real estate unless and until the beneficiary elected to do so by directing
a conveyance to himself. Chicago Title, 300 Ill. App. at 336, 20 N.E.2d at 995. By the terms
of the trust agreement, however, the power of direction was effective immediately. The trustee's
duty and power to sell was free of the control of the beneficiaries and, hence, the beneficiary's
right to "reconvert" would not arise until the termination of the trust 20 years later.
88. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 5 (1966); 18 C.J.S. Conversion §§ 12, 23 (1939).
89. Lynch v. Cunningham, 131 Cal. App. 164, 173, 21 P.2d 154, 157 (1933); Keller v.
Schobert, 58 Il. 2d 137, 142, 31 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1974).
90. See Swiderski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 102 111. App. 3d 783, 430 N.E.2d 339
(1st Dist. 1981) (normal procedure for trustees is to resign rather than to let the twenty years
run out and force the sale of the property). As Professor Kenoe stated, "The trustees will
make every effort to avoid a public sale as a procedure for terminating the trust." H. KENOE,
supra note 1, § 4.32, at 50.
91. Yedor v. Chicago City Bank, 376 Ill. 121, 33 N.E. 220 (1941).
92. "As a practical matter, this duty is never expected to be performed (contrary directions
are invariably delivered to the trustee)." ACPC Study, supra note 2, at 2.
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Based upon the above reasons, there should be no equitable conversion
of the beneficial interest of land trusts from realty to personalty until the
trust terminates." The specific recitations in land trust agreements that the
beneficiaries' interests are personal property and that they have no legal or
equitable title in the real estate are not sufficient to cause an equitable
conversion."
The doctrine of equitable conversion should especially not be applied to
third parties such as judgment creditors, whose claims are not based on the
trust agreement or on the rights of parties thereto." As an equitable princi-
ple, rather than a rigid rule of law,9" the doctrine should be applied only
to the extent appropriate to meet the ends of equity and justice.97 It should
never be invoked in the aid of fraud or wrong.98 To the extent that a con-
veyance into a land trust makes the property immune from judgment liens
93. This conclusion is not altered by the rule that a positive direction to sell upon the death
of the testator results in an equitable conversion even though the time of sale is postponed
until the death of a life tenant. See Lash v. Lash, 209 I11. 595 (1904). During the life of the
tenant, the remainder beneficiaries, unlike land trust beneficiaries, have no power to compel
the executor to convey the real estate. As to the remaindermen, the executor's duty to sell
is mandatory and irrevocable upon the death of the testator. Hence the remainder interest is
fixed as personal property at that time, although its enjoyment is postponed.
94. These recitations, however, are effective for some purposes as a contractual conversion
which is binding on the parties and others claiming under the agreement. Gallagher v. Drovers
Bank, 404 Ill. 410, 88 N.E.2d 870 (1949); Harrison v. Kamp, 395 Ill. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946);
Baker v. Commissioner, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E.593 (1925). In Smith v. Kelley, 387 Ill. 213,
56 N.E.2d 360 (1944), the interests of the beneficiaries were personal property not because
of the recitations but, as explained in Gallagher, 404 11. at 413, 88 N.E.2d at 872, because
the agreement worked an equitable conversion by vesting in the trustees "an imperative duty
and complete power to sell."
95. The courts have specifically held that the doctrine of equitable conversion will not be
invoked either for or against third parties whose claims are not based on the instrument or
on the rights of parties thereto. For example, in First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 111.
2d 147, 160 N.E.2d 802 (1959), the court denied equitable conversion to an insurance company
which suffered a loss when the owner entered into a contract of sale at a much lower price
than a previous appraisal. According to the court, equitable conversion
evolved in order to carry out the intention of the parties to the contract. To that
end it acts upon the rights of the parties to the contract and those who claim under
them. But it has been frequently held and stated that it should have no effect upon
the rights of others.
Id. at 150-51, 160 N.E.2d at 804; see also Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Ill. 2d 214, 193 N.E.2d 786 (1963).
In Lang v. Klinger, 34 Cal. App. 3d 987, 110 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1973), a contract to sell real
estate was held not to have converted the seller's interest to personalty so as to deprive his
creditor of a judgment lien. The court stated that equitable conversion "does not become effective
as to persons whose claims or rights to the property are purely incidental, not at all connected
with its devolution or transfer from the author or through the instrument." Id. at 992, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 534.
96. As one scholar stated, "[wlhen we speak of conversion we are not describing a condi-
tion of the property for all purposes with respect to everybody but are giving a name to a
situation resulting from the application of equitable doctrines to a state of facts between cer-
tain parties." Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831 (1920).
97. City of Chicago v. Salinger, 384 111. 515, 520, 52 N.E.2d 184, 187 (1944).
98. Vigli v. Davis, 79 Cal. App. 2d 237, 255, 179 P.2d 586, 597 (1947).
19841 ILLINOIS LAND TRUST
through conversion to personal property, such a conveyance hinders and
delays creditors in the satisfaction of their just debts. It is, therefore, a con-
veyance in fraud of creditors.99 Equitable conversion should thus not be ap-
plied when doing so would deprive creditors of a valid judgment lien.' 0
99. A "fraudulent conveyance" has been defined as a "conveyance or transfer of property,
the object of which is to defraud a creditor, or hinder or delay him, or to put such property
beyond his reach." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 596 (5th ed. 1979).
A conveyance of real estate by a debtor to another, to be held wholly or in part
in trust for him, is a fraud on creditors whether so intended or not, as it places
beyond their reach a valuable right and gives to the debtor the beneficial enjoy-
ment of what rightfully belongs to them. In such a case the conveyance is void
as to existing and subsequent creditors. The fraud is a continuing one, and may
actually operate as such as well in reference to debts contracted after as before
the conveyance.
McKey v. Cochran, 262 Ill. 376, 384-85, 104 N.E. 693, 696 (1914). One appellate court stated:
No effort of a debtor to hinder or delay his creditors is more severely condemned
by law than an attempt to place his property where he can enjoy it, but require
his creditors to await his pleasure for the payment of their claims out of it. A
man cannot be the beneficial owner of property and still have it exempt from his
debts. Subsequent as well as existing creditors may have such transaction declared
fraudulent. A conveyance to the use of the grantor is fraudulent in law, and void
as to creditors, without regard to the intent with which it was made.
Crane v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 238 Ill. App. 257, 262 (1st Dist. 1925). The court made
clear that this rule applies without regard to whether the beneficial interest is secret.
100. It may be argued that the nonavailability of judgment liens is of little consequence
to creditors since execution liens, see Asher v. United States, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1978);
Kaiser-Ducett Corp. v. Chicago-Joliet Livestock Marketing Center, 86 Il. App. 3d 216, 407
N.E.2d 1149 (3d Dist. 1980); Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist.
1968), and citation liens, see Mid-West Nat'l Bank v. Metcoff, 23 111. App. 3d 607, 319 N.E.2d
336 (2d Dist. 1974); Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Ill. App. 2d 243, 243 N.E.2d 501
(1st Dist. 1968), do attach to land trust beneficial interests. Upon execution, however, the
beneficial interest may not be levied upon and sold by the sheriff; to obtain the property,
the judgment creditor must stand the expense of citation proceedings. Kaiser-Ducett, 86 Ill.
App. 3d at 219, 407 N.E.2d at 1151. Furthermore, execution liens last only 90 days. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, § 12-110 (1983). In contrast, a judgment lien lasts seven years. Id. § 12-101.
A citation lien may not be effective until service of the citation on the debtor, giving him
an opportunity to transfer or encumber the property.
It may also be argued that unsecured creditor liens of any kind against land trust beneficial
interests are of limited value because the beneficiary can destroy the lien by directing the trustee
to convey the property to a "bonafide purchaser" without notice of the creditor's interest.
See Chicago Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 11. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962)
(federal tax lien attaching to beneficial interest was destroyed by subsequent mortgage to "in-
nocent" mortgagee in good faith and without knowledge of beneficiary's identity). Unlike the
situation in Cacciatore, in most transactions involving land trust property, the buyer or broker
deals directly with the beneficiary, knows who he is, and therefore is on constructive notice
of judgments against the beneficiary along with any executions and citations issued pursuant
thereto. See Eckland v. Jankowski, 407 Il1. 263, 95 N.E.2d 263 (1950); Clark v. Levitt, 335
Ill. 184, 166 N.E.2d 538 (1929); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 133 (1947). Hence he is not a bonafide
purchaser without notice. Furthermore, even in a bonafide purchaser fact situation, the creditor
may be able to get satisfaction by suing the trustee. See supra note 19.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:277
As a general rule, equitable conversion will not be enforced to circumvent
public policy as expressed in statutes.' Furthermore, a lawful purpose is
a prerequisite for its application.102 The judgment lien statute is a clear
legislative expression of public policy in favor of enforcement and satisfac-
tion of judgments.'03 Equitable conversion should not be used to counter-
mand this policy.' 0
The Chicago Title court also found that the nature of the beneficiary's
interest was controlled by the trust agreement provisions labeling the interest
as personal property. In other words, the trust agreement achieved a con-
tractual, as distinct from an equitable, conversion."' This rationale is weak
for several reasons. First, the nature and extent of a judgment lien are
statutorily created. Generally, statutes should be construed in a way which
will defeat subterfuges, expediencies, or evasions.'6 Statutorily created rights
of third parties relating to interests in real estate should turn upon what
the property is in fact, not upon what the parties to a trust agreement say
it is.
Second, a buyer and seller of real estate cannot, by voluntary agreement,
affect a judgment creditor's lien on the buyer's interest.' 7 Neither can par-
ties to a mortgage foreclosure agree to cut off the statutory rights of redemp-
tion vested in third party judgment creditors.' 8 As a general rule, contrac-
tual obligations are limited to the contracting parties and cannot be enforced
against strangers to the contract.' 0 Thus, the personal property and equitable
title recitations in land trust agreements should not be binding on those who
101. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 3 (1966); 18 C.J.S Conversion § 7 (1939).
102. See Bennett v. Bennett, 282 11. 266, 118 N.E. 391 (1918).
103. Durham v, Heaton, 38 I11. 264, 275 (1862); Cochran v. Cutler, 39 111. App. 3d 602,
609, 350 N.E.2d 59, 64 (2d Dist. 1976).
104. In Chicago Title the court stated that, "[l~t has frequently been held that where a trust
accomplished an equitable conversion of land, a judgment against a beneficiary of the proceeds
of such conversion was not a lien on the land." 300 I11. App. at 338, 20 N.E.2d at 996. The
cases cited by the court involved multiple beneficiaries of wills and trusts. The equitable reason
why a judgment lien should not attach in such cases is that if a judgment creditor of only
one of several beneficiaries of a will or trust were to levy execution and force partition, thus
blocking a sale by the executor or trustee, the other innocent beneficiaries would suffer a loss.
See Robison v. Botkin, 181 111. 182, 54 N.E. 915 (1899); Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 I11. 103
(1853). Chicago Title, however, involved a sole beneficiary. Moreover, the equitable considera-
tions underlying this rule are absent when multiple land trust beneficiaries voluntarily set up
the land trust for their own benefit. They can protect their property against the financial pro-
blems of one beneficiary by forming a partnership or by agreeing not to partition.
105. Chicago Title, 300 111. App. at 336, 20 N.E.2d at 995.
106. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 252 (1974).
107. Gorham v. Farson, 119 111. 425, 10 N.E. 1 (1887); cf. Cochran v. Cutler, 39 Ill. App.
3d 602, 350 N.E.2d 59 (2d Dist. 1972) (purchaser-debtor may not defeat judgment lien by
conveying property to third party).
108. See Williams v. Williston, 315 Ill. 178, 146 N.E. 143 (1924).
109. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 294 (1964); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 520 (1963). "A
contract which is personal in its character and effect will not bind third persons unless they
become parties thereto by express or implied assumption of its obligations." 12A ILLINOIS LAW
AND PRACTICE Contracts § 281 (1983).
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are not claiming through the trust agreement or through the parties to it.
Public policy favors satisfaction of judgments and opposes fraudulent con-
veyances. Thus, the agreement between beneficiary and trustee to classify
real estate as personal property should not be enforced by the courts when
a violation of public policy would result."' Since the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, courts have stressed that legal fictions should be limited to situations
in which they serve the interest of justice and should not be permitted to
work a wrong or injury."' Fictions "are not allowed to obscure the facts,
when the facts become important," and "when logic and the policy of a
state conflict with a fiction due to historical tradition, the fiction must give
way.' 112
b. Impact of Chicago Title
The Chicago Title court stopped short of deciding whether the beneficial
interest was an interest in real estate for purposes of the judgment lien statute
as distinct from the Statute of Uses. Problems thus arose in subsequent in-
terpretations of lien statutes. For example, the federal statute providing for
a lien against assets of delinquent taxpayers states that such liens attach to
"all property and rights to property, whether real or personal."' 3 In Chicago
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Cacciatore, " the appellate court held
that such liens do not attach to land trust beneficial interests because such
interests are not property interests per se.''I Citing Chicago Title, the court
added, in dicta, that "a judgment against a land trust beneficiary did not
constitute a lien against the real estate."'' 6 The court further stated that
"[plurchasers and lenders .. .were repeatedly assured by courts of review
that the trust beneficiaries had no interest in real estate, and that even so
strong a charge as a judgment lien against a trust beneficiary was, therefore,
no encumbrance against the real estate title." ' '' 7
Even though on appeal the supreme court stated that the beneficial in-
110. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 5.34, at 139.
111. See United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. 398, 415 (1814); Johnson v. Smith,
97 Eng. Rep. 654 (1760).
112. See Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 204, 206 (1903).
113. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6321 (1954 & Supp. 1983-1984).
114. 33 111. App. 2d 131, 178 N.E.2d 888 (1st Dist. 1961).
115. Id. at 139, 178 N.E.2d at 893. But cf Southwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cosmopolitan
Nat'l Bank, 23 111. App. 2d 174, 161 N.E.2d 697 (1st Dist. 1959) (tax lien attaches to land
trust beneficial interest). The Cacciatore appellate court's position was rejected by the Illinois
Supreme Court, which stated that the beneficial interest (the power of direction) was a proper-
ty right or interest to which the tax lien attached. Chicago Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cac-
ciatore, 25 111. 2d 535, 544-45, 185 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1962). The decision of the appellate court,
however, was affirmed on a substantially different ground-that the subsequent mortgagee claim-
ing priority over the tax lien was a bona fide purchaser of the legal title interest without notice
of the tax lien against the equitable interest of the beneficiary, and that the subsequent mort-
gagee had no duty to inquire into the propriety of the trustee's conveyance. Id. at 546-48,
185 N.E.2d at 675-76.
116. Cacciatore, 33 Ill. App. 2d at 139, 178 N.E.2d at 893.
117. Id. at 140, 178 N.E.2d at 893.
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terest was subject to the tax lien, nonetheless it stated that "[tihe basic ques-
tion here is not . . .whether the lien of the government attaches to the
real estate-concededly, it does not."'' 8 The court elaborated:
Both the trust agreement and the deed to the trustee contain clauses used
for many years in the creation of an Illinois land trust. We have recog-
nized the validity of such a procedure to place in the trustee the full, com-
plete and exclusive title to the real estate, both legal and equitable. The
trust here is an active trust, and Cacciatore's beneficial interest is personal
property by the terms of the recorded trust deed, the trust agreement itself,
and by settled Illinois law.' 9
The Cacciatore court, however, like the Chicago Title court, stopped short
of specifically holding that a judgment lien does not attach to a land trust
beneficial interest, as distinct from the real estate title in the hands of the
trustee.
In a 1966 decision, Sterling Savings & Loan Association v. Schultz, 120 the
appellate court took the final step and, relying primarily on Chicago Title
and Cacciatore (appellate decision), held squarely that a judgment lien does
not reach the beneficiary's interest in a land trust:
Since the only interest of a beneficiary under a land trust is considered
to be personal property, a judgment cannot attach to such interest. The
Illinois Statute relating to judgments against real estate specifically states
that a judgment is a lien on real estate. It makes no mention of personal
property, nor of the interest of a beneficiary under a land trust.'"
A definitive decision as to whether a judgment lien attaches to a land
trust beneficial interest remains to be made by the Illinois Supreme Court.' 2
Based upon law, logic, and sound public policy, the supreme court should
disregard the lower court opinions on the subject. The beneficiary has the
118. Cacciatore, 25 I1. 2d at 544, 185 N.E.2d at 674.
119. Id. at 543, 185 N.E.2d at 674.
120. 71 I1. App. 2d 94, 218 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1966).
121. Id. at 107, 218 N.E.2d at 60.
122. Chicago Title and Cacciatore (appellate decision) were also relied upon by the appellate
court to hold that a lien under the Public Aid Code upon "all legal and equitable interests
of recipients in real property," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 3-10 (1983), did not reach land trust
real estate. Nelson v. Folegstrom, 5 Ill. App. 3d 804, 806, 284 N.E.2d 339, 341 (3d Dist.
1972). Sterling was cited and followed in First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 11. App.
3d 54, 389 N.E.2d 652 (2d Dist. 1979) (judgment lien does not attach to beneficial interest).
See also Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 123 II1. App. 3d 282, 462
N.E.2d 741 (Ist Dist. 1984) (assignment of beneficial interest of land trust as security for
a loan creates a personal property security interest and not an equitable mortgage so that judg-
ment lien does not attach).
On the other hand, two earlier appellate court decisions assumed, without discussion, that
beneficial interests were subject to judgment liens. See Southwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Cosmopolitan Bank, 23 111. App. 2d 174, 161 N.E.2d 697 (1st Dist. 1959); Johnson v. Watson,
309 I1. App. 440, 33 N.E.2d 130 (1st Dist. 1941) (abstract opinion).
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absolute right to manage, possess, and control the land trust property. 2 3
Furthermore, he has the absolute power and right to direct the trustee to
convey or mortgage the title to the property to anyone, including himself,
at any time, during the life of the trust. The trustee in turn has an absolute
obligation to comply with the beneficiary's direction.2 4 As noted earlier,
this arrangement gives the beneficiary equitable title to the real estate. 5
Certainly this equitable title is sufficient to qualify as a right to, or interest
in, the real estate for the purposes of the judgment lien statute.
An unsecured creditor who asserts a judgment lien against a land trust
beneficial interest is a third party who does not assert his claims against
the property either through the trust agreement or through a party who is
bound by its terms. Such a creditor, therefore, should not be bound by the
agreement to classify the beneficiary's interest as personal property. Nor
should the creditor be otherwise estopped from asserting that the beneficiary
has a real estate interest. Because the judgment lien statute specifically in-
cludes equitable rights and interests, the lack of legal title in the beneficiary
should be irrelevant.
Contractual Powers and Rights of the Beneficiary
At one time, the Illinois courts took the position that land trust beneficiaries
could not make a contract to convey title or a lease because they had only
a personal property interest and did not have legal title.2 6 This broad doc-
123. Possession of real estate is an "interest in land" for purposes of the Statute of Frauds.
See Catlett v. Dougherty, 21 Ill. App. 116 (3d Dist. 1886). The right to real estate rentals
is an interest in real estate for purposes of the Recording Act. See Kahn v. Deerpark Inv.
Co., 115 Il. App. 2d 121, 253 N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist. 1969). "[O]ne who has an unrestricted
right to the use and enjoyment of real estate has the estate itself." Garwood v. Garwood,
244 Ill. 580, 587, 91 N.E. 672, 675 (1910). Land trust beneficiaries have all of these rights
Robinson v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 32 I1. App. 2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 659 (1st Dist. 1961).
124. The beneficiary has "control of the selling" of the trust real estate. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Oldenburg, 101 111. App. 3d 283, 427 N.E.2d 1312 (2d Dist. 1981); Lampinen v. Hicks,
73 Ill. App. 3d 376, 391 N.E.2d 1105 (2d Dist. 1979); Madigan v. Buehr, 125 11. App. 2d
8, 260 N.E.2d 431 (1st Dist. 1970). According to the Illinois legislature, "the legislature recognized
that the direction and control of the real estate was in the hands of the beneficiaries because
the trustee acted solely as holder of the legal title and was subject at all times to the direction
and control of the beneficiaries." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 81(l)(a)(3) (1983). The courts
have specifically held that the power of direction in a land trust is a property interest. See
Kavanaugh v. Estate, 86 Ill. App. 3d 33, 407 N.E.2d 856 (1st Dist. 1980); Favata v. Favata,
74 Ill. App. 3d 979, 394 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979). Since it is the power to direct con-
veyances of real estate, it follows that it is a property interest in real estate.
125. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Marshall Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 56 Ill. App. 2d 372,
379, 206 N.E.2d 117, 120 (2d Dist. 1965) (beneficiary cannot contract to convey title); Koehler
v. Southmoor Bank and Trust Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 195, 200-01, 189 N.E.2d 22, 24-25 (1st
Dist. 1963) (beneficiary denied status of lessor on lease executed by trustee); Schneider v. Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank, 26 111. App. 2d 463, 466, 168 N.E.2d 808, 809 (1st Dist. 1960) (beneficiary
cannot contract to convey title); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Kosterlitz, 329 Il1. App. 244, 246-47,
67 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1st Dist. 1946) (land trust beneficiary could not be lessor).
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trine, however, has been steadily eroded.' 27 In Madigan v. Buehr,28 for
example, the court ruled that the beneficiary could lawfully contract to sell
the real estate, but could not represent herself as the owner with power to
convey title.' 29 The court recited the personal property fiction as support
for the proposition that the beneficiary was not the owner of the legal title
and, therefore, only the trustee could execute a contract in that capacity. 3 '
Several appellate court decisions have cited the personal property fiction
to emphasize that the beneficiary, having no title, cannot contract, repre-
sent, or otherwise act in the name of, or on behalf of, the legal titleholding
trustee.'3 The problems posed in these cases would have been better resolved
127. See, e.g., Madigan v. Buehr, 125 I11. App. 2d 8, 260 N.E.2d 431 (1st Dist. 1970)
(beneficiary can contract to sell real estate); Klein v. Ickovitz, 121 I11. App. 2d 191, 257 N.E.2d
187 (1st Dist. 1970) (approved beneficiary leases); Keessen v. Zarattini, 119 111. App. 2d 284,
256 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist. 1969) (beneficiary did not need title to contract for an easement).
128. 125 I1. App. 2d 8, 260 N.E.2d 431 (1st Dist. 1970).
129. Id. at 16-17, 260 N.E.2d at 434-35.
130. Id. at 11-12, 260 N.E.2d at 432-33. The Madigan court stated:
[T]he nature of the land trust is such that, if the trust is to be preserved, the powers
of the beneficiary and the trustee must be kept distinct. In negotiating for the sale
of trust property, and in the contract of sale or articles of agreement, the beneficiary
cannot . . . deal with the property as if no trust existed.
Id. at 16, 260 N.E.2d at 435. But cf. Lampinen v. Hicks, 73 111. App. 3d 376, 391 N.E.2d
1105 (2d Dist. 1979) (contract upheld because court refused to distinguish between a seller's
legal capability to sell property to which he does not presently have title and a land trust
beneficiary's capacity to direct his trustee to transfer the title). The Lampinen court criticized
the Madigan decision, stating that "[ilt may well be that the time has come to void or avoid
land trusts in Illinois." Lampinen, 73 I11. App. 3d at 379, 391 N.E.2d at 1107. In Favata
v. Favata, 74 111. App. 3d 979, 394 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979), a land trust settlor-beneficiary
had amended his trust agreement to direct the trustee that, upon his death, the precise "real
estate" that was held in the trust should go to his son. A previous amendment had directed
that his "interest under this trust" go to his daughter. The court ruled in favor of the daughter,
reasoning that since the original trust agreement provided that the beneficiary's interest was
personal property, the trustee was not bound by any subsequent amendment which referred
to the beneficiary's interest as real estate. As set forth in a strong dissent by Justice McGloon,
the court erred in its literal interpretation of the beneficiary's language. There could have been
absolutely no doubt in the mind of the trustee as to the intent of the settlor.
131. See, e.g., Kurek v. State Oil Co., 98 Il1. App. 3d 6, 8, 424 N.E.2d 56, 58 (1st Dist.
1981) (notice of intent to exercise option to extend lease must be given to trustee and such
notice to beneficiary held ineffective); Seaberg v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 I11.
App. 3d 1065, 1069-71, 342 N.E.2d 751, 754-55 (1st Dist. 1976) (lease executed by beneficiary
acting as authorized agent of trustee held invalid); Feinberg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 131 111. App. 2d 1087, 1089-90, 266 N.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1st Dist. 1970) (beneficiary could
not act as agent of the trustee to execute a binding lease which designated the land trustee
as lessor); Schneider v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank, 26 Ill. App. 2d 463, 466, 168 N.E.2d
808, 809 (Ist Dist. 1960) (when an offer to purchase real estate is directed to the trustee, the
beneficiary cannot accept it). But see Seaberg, 35 111. App. 3d at 1074, 342 N.E.2d at 757
(Simon, J., concurring) (concurring opinion pointed out that the majority opinion shows the
"artificialities" needed to handle the land trust beneficiary/trustee relationship in Illinois). The
rationale of Schneider was mentioned in First Nat'l Bank v. Oldenburg, 101 Ill. App. 3d 283,
288, 427 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (2d Dist. 1981), but was distinguished on the ground that the
offerors in Oldenburg knew that they were dealing with the beneficiaries.
ILLINOIS LAND TRUST
by recognizing that, whenever the trustee contracts, it is contracting at the
direction of the beneficiary and, therefore, is the agent of the beneficiary.' 32
It follows that the beneficiary should be able to contract and otherwise act
in the name of his trustee.
Regarding a beneficiary's standing to sue, the Illinois courts have held
that since the beneficiary has no title and only a personal property interest,
he has no standing to sue to enforce a lease'33 or to revoke a plat of dedica-
tion for highway purposes.' In a more recent case, however, the court held
that a land trust beneficiary is considered to be an "owner" of or to have
an "interest" in real estate that is being condemned, therefore, entitling him
to intervene in the condemnation litigation affecting his property.'33 As with
contract questions, recognition that the trustee is the agent of the beneficiary
should lead to a decision allowing the beneficiary to sue in the trustee's name.
Alternatively, the beneficiary could assert his position as a third-party
beneficiary of the trustee's contract, with standing to sue for its breach.
Collateral Assignments of Beneficial Interests
The Illinois Supreme Court applied the land trust personal property fic-
tion to collateral assignments in Homey v. Hayes.'36 In Homey, the plain-
tiff placed his apartment building in a land trust in November 1948. The
trust agreement contained the usual representations that the beneficiary's in-
terest was personal property and that the beneficiary had no legal or equitable
title to the real estate. In April 1950, the plaintiff borrowed $3000 from
132. See Kessler v. Pioneer Bank, 101 Ill. App. 3d 502, 428 N.E.2d 608 (1st Dist. 1981);
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see also Okey, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 96 Il1. App. 3d 987, 422 N.E.2d 221 (1st Dist. 1981) (payment of rent to beneficiary
held effective to reinstate lessor's rights under the lease even though lease was executed by
trustee); Devon Bank v. Schlinder, 72 Ill. App. 3d 147, 151-52, 390 N.E.2d 447, 450-51 (1st
Dist. 1979) (court upheld contract to purchase land trust real estate which listed trustee as
seller but was signed by beneficiaries). The rationale for the Devon Bank decision was as follows:
The defendants [contract purchasers] concede that the beneficiaries had the 'sole
right of direction' under the terms of the underlying trust agreement. The Agree-
ment itself clearly indicated that the plaintiff was the seller only in its capacity
as the trustee of a particular trust and that the persons who signed the document
were the beneficiaries of the same trust .... [Allthough the plaintiff held the legal
title, the beneficiaries, if they possessed the sole right of direction, had the power
to bind both themselves and the trustee in an agreement such as the one before
us. . . . The defendants do not argue that the entire contract was null and void
because it was not signed by the plaintiff.
Id.
133. See Jakovljevich v. Alvarez, 113 I1. App. 2d 302, 252 N.E.2d 60 (1st Dist. 1969)
(beneficiary has no right to bring action when only the trustee is party to lease).
134. Robinette v. Department of Pub. Works and Bldgs., 2 Il. App. 3d 438, 276 N.E.2d
804 (2d Dist. 1971).
135. Department of Conservation v. Franzen, 43 Il1. App. 3d 374, 356 N.E.2d 1245 (2d
Dist. 1976).
136. 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957).
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the defendant. As security for the loan, he assigned the beneficial interest
in the land trust to the defendant, giving him the right to sell the interest
at a private sale should the plaintiff default on the loan. The plaintiff
defaulted and the defendant sold the beneficial interest. The plaintiff sued
to set aside the sale and compel the defendant to initiate a judicial foreclosure,
providing the plaintiff with the right to redeem."' The plaintiff asserted that
the loan transaction amounted to a real estate mortgage and that under
Illinois law, sale of the property must be by judicial foreclosure.' 9 The court
ruled that the defendant had sold only the beneficial interest, which was
personal property and, therefore, that the sale of the certificate was not
prohibited.'39
The result reached by the Homey court did not necessarily depend upon
a finding that the beneficial interest of a land trust is personal property.
Just as easily and perhaps more appropriately, it could have been upheld
on principles of estoppel. The borrower represented to the lender that his
interest was personal property. This representation induced the lender to make
the loan because it gave him a more secure position than he would have
had under the real estate mortgage laws. As the parties contracted with this
understanding, the borrower should have been estopped from changing his
position to the lender's detriment.'" The Homey court noted that the land
trust in question was not originally created as security for a debt and that
the loan transaction occurred sixteen months after the creation of the trust, ' 14
implying that the loan would have been subject to the mortgage laws had
these factors not been present.' 42 Later decisions have been more explicit.' 3
137. Id. at 180, 142 N.E.2d at 95. Illinois law gives a defendant six months to redeem prop-
erty sold to satisfy a judgment. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-122 (1983).
138. 11 111. 2d at 180, 142 N.E.2d at 95.
139. Id. at 183, 142 N.E.2d at 97.
140. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107 (1964) (theory of quasi-estoppel excuses the element of
justifiable reliance). While Illinois Trust Co. v. Bibo, 328 I11. 252, 159 N.E. 254 (1927), in-
dicates that borrowers are not estopped from asserting mortgage foreclosure and redemption
rights, Horney impliedly overrules that principle where a land trust was set up for a different
purpose in advance of the loan and hence the representation was not required, induced, or
solicited by the lender.
141. 11 Ill. 2d at 184, 142 N.E.2d at 97. The pledge of the beneficial interest "does not
provide for sale of the real estate . . . nor was the trust itself created as security for a debt.
The transaction between plaintiff and Hayes occurred subsequent to the creation of the trust,
and concerned only the beneficial interest represented by the certificate." Id.
142. As one commentator warned,
Beneficial interest financing transactions should involve trusts that were created before
the loan transaction was negotiated. Requiring the property to be placed in a land
trust and its beneficial interest assigned as a condition to a loan may subject the
lender to the possibility that the transaction will be held to be a mortgage and
require foreclosure with statutory redemption rights attending it.
H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 5.34, at 141.
143. See, e.g., Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 123 111. App. 3d 282,
462 N.E. 2d 741 (lst Dist 1984) (where parties to transaction do not intend that it be an equitable
mortgage, it is not a mortgage); Landino v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 Ill. App. 3d 740, 458
N.E.2d 1070 (1983) (where creation of trust is purely for purpose of serving as security for
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This interpretation, however, is widely ignored by lenders.' 4 4
In Levine v. Pascal, 14 the appellate court held that because a land trust
beneficial interest was personal property, a collateral assignment of the
beneficial interest made to secure a loan was not exempt from the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) requirement that a financing statement be filed
with the Secretary of State.' 6 As in Homey, the same result could have
been reached by the Levine court using estoppel principles. The assignee
stepped into the shoes of the beneficiary and, therefore, was bound by the
recitations of the trust agreement. He should have been estopped from later
asserting that the beneficial interest was real estate in order to defeat a judg-
ment creditor who, in reliance on the UCC and on the personal property
recitations, perfected a lien against the debtor's beneficial interests.
In much the same way that a beneficiary is bound by his representations
that his interest is personalty, so also are his heirs and devisees. In a recent
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contention that a decedent's
security assignment of the beneficial interest of property that was held in
joint tenancy was an equitable real estate mortgage.' 7 The court asserted
debt, transaction is equitable mortgage subject to right of repemption); In re Farnik, 17 Bankr.
856 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (where creation of trust, borrowing of funds, and assignment of
beneficial interest are one transaction, land trust may not be used to circumvent right of redemp-
tion); Quinn v. Pullman Trust & Sav. Bank, 98 I11. App. 2d 402, 405, 240 N.E.2d 791, 793
(1st Dist. 1968) (assignment of beneficial interest of land trust as security for a loan will not
constitute a real estate mortgage if the trust agreement itself contains no provision for the
sale of the real estate corpus of the trust, and "where [the trust] is set up for purposes other
than as security for a debt, where the pledge of the beneficial interest is subsequent to the
creation of the trust, and where the pledge security transaction is of the trust beneficial interest
only .. "). See generally Lindberg, Assignments of Beneficial Interests in Illinois Land Trusts
as Security for a Debt, 70 ILL. B. J. 576 (1982) (discussing multiple aspects of beneficial land
trust interests in Illinois). But cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pogue, 72 Ill. App. 3d
54, 389 N.E.2d 652 (2d Dist. 1979) (transactions did not amount to a mortgage when the loan
was secured by a pledge of the beneficial interest made three days after creation of the land
trust by the same bank that served as the land trustee).
144. A borrower recounted the following experience:
We recently were required to obtain a bank loan to get funds needed for our business.
The bank made us put up our home as security for the loan. Originally, I thought
we would be giving the bank a second mortgage, but it turned out that the papers
we signed actually put title to the house in the bank's name instead of ours. It
was explained to us that we were simply putting title into a land trust that was
being established by us in the bank's trust department. We were told that we would
be the beneficiaries of the trust, but that we were executing an assignment of this
beneficial interest to the bank as security for the loan.
The loan officer said that this was a very common way for banks to make loans
to business people. We needed the money so we signed whatever we had to sign
to get it.
Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 8, 1983, Homelife, at 29, col. 1.
145. 94 I11. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1968).
146. Id. at 52, 236 N.E.2d at 429. As a general rule, Illinois law usually exempts any interest
in or lien upon real estate from the Uniform Commercial Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §
9-104(j) (1983).
147. Estate of Alpert, 95 111. 2d 377, 447 N.E.2d 796 (1983).
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that the "trustee of an Illinois land trust has both legal and equitable title
[and a] beneficiary's interest in an Illinois land trust is personal property
and not real property."... 8 This recitation of the personal property fiction
can be interpreted as support for the proposition that, as against the lender,
the decedent and those claiming under him are bound by the agreed
characterization of the decedent's interest as personal property. Heirs and
devisees are bound by representations of ancestors and testators that would
have been binding on the latter during their lifetimes."9
In situations where the secured assignment creditor is also the trustee of
the land trust, the security interest is considered an interest in real estate
which is exempt from the provisions of the UCC."' Furthermore, such a
transaction is arguably equivalent to a real estate mortgage subject to
foreclosure and redemption. In Home Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Zarkin," the court held that a land trust trustee had a high degree of
fiduciary duty to its beneficiary, and therefore, was barred from purchasing
the trust property at a foreclosure sale.' 2 It can be implied from Zarkin
that the fiduciary duty may be violated when a trustee loans money to its
beneficiary on terms that result in the beneficiary's loss of foreclosure and
redemption rights. The fiduciary obligations of a trustee-lender should re-
quire, at the very least, an explicit disclosure to the borrower of the legal
consequences of a beneficial interest assignment transaction.
Debtor and Tax Relief
Two areas in which the land trust personal property fiction have been
greatly eroded are debtor relief and taxation. Under the Illinois Homestead
Act, a debtor is exempt from the claims of his creditors to the extent of
$7500 in "the farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, . . . owned or
rightly possessed by lease or otherwise."' 53 This language was originally held
to require a legal title interest; therefore, a land trust beneficiary's personal
property interest did not qualify."' In 1981, however, the legislature amended
the Homestead Act to extend the homestead exemption to homeowners whose
property interest is "personal property."' 5
A homestead exemption from property taxes extends to any person over
sixty-five who is "an owner of record of a legal or equitable interest in
148. Id. at 382, 447 N.E.2d at 798.
149. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 132 (1964); 18 ILLINoIs LAW AND PRACTICE Estoppel § 35 (1956).
150. See Estate of McGaughey, 60 App. 3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 259 (1st Dist. 1978).
151. 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
152. The trustee-creditor argued unsuccessfully that since the land trust served only to hold
title, the trustee had no fiduciary duty. Id. at 239, 432 N.E.2d at 845. But see H. KENOE,
supra note 1, § 15.11, at 3.
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983).
154. See Hutter v. Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank, 54 111. App. 3d 653, 370 N.E.2d 47 (1st
Dist. 1977); Sterling Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schultz, 71 111. App. 2d 94, 113, 218 N.E.2d 53,
63 (1st Dist. 1966).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983).
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[a] cooperative apartment building."' 56 The statute has been liberally con-
strued by the tax assessor; consequently, this statutory provision has been
honored in favor of beneficiary co-owners of a cooperative apartment
building, title to which was in a land trust." '
A land trust beneficiary is considered an "owner" or person "interested"
or "having an interest in" real estate for purposes of redemption at state'58
and federal' 9 property tax sales. One court which took this position, however,
asserted that nonetheless the beneficiary does not have a legal or equitable
interest in the real estate.' 6 °
Despite his possession of an interest that is labeled personalty, a beneficiary
also has the status of a "mortgagor" of real estate for the purpose of cur-
ing a default on a legal title mortgage executed by the trustee.' 6 ' Additional-
ly, a land trust beneficiary is an "equitable owner of real property" eligible
for relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Act.' 62
Property Tax Liability
In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court held that land trust beneficiaries were
real estate "owners" for real estate tax purposes. In People v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 63 the state sued to recover unpaid real estate taxes on land
held in land trusts. The defendants were land trust beneficiaries as well as
banks and trust companies in both their corporate and their land trust trustee
capacities. The supreme court held the beneficiaries liable for the taxes.'6 4
The court cogently analyzed the land trust relationships as follows:
In a land trust the legal and equitable title lies with the trustee and the
beneficiary retains what is referred to as a personal property interest. It
is important to note, however, that though referred to as personal prop-
erty, most of the usual attributes of real property ownership are retained
by the beneficiary under the trust agreement. . . . The term "owner"
as applied to land, has no fixed meaning applicable under all circumstances
and as to any and every enactment. It usually denotes a fee simple estate,
but in Illinois it may include "one who has the usufruct control or oc-
cupation of land with a claim of ownership, whether his interest be an
absolute fee or less estate." Title to property does not necessarily involve
ownership of the property. Title refers only to a legal relationship to the
land, while ownership is coinparable to control and denotes an interest
in the real estate other than that of holding title thereto ...
156. Id. ch. 120, § 500.23-1.
157. See Brandzel v. Koretzky, 66 111. App. 3d 717, 384 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1978) (per-
sonal property recitations were ignored).
158. See In re Application of County Treasurer (Spachman v. Overton), 16 Ill. App. 3d
385, 306 N.E.2d 743 (2d Dist. 1974).
159. See DiFoggio v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
160. See County Treasurer, 16 Ill. App. 3d at 389-90, 306 N.E.2d at 748.
161. See Evergreen Sav. v. Barnard, 65 111. App. 3d 492, 382 N.E.2d 467 (1st Dist. 1978).
162. See Matter of Gladstone Glen, 628 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting People v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 75 I11. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540 (1979)).
163. 75 I11. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540 (1979).
164. Id. at 494, 389 N.E.2d at 546.
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In examining a land trust it is apparent that true ownership lies with
the beneficiaries though title lies with the trustee. The trustee derives all
of his power from the beneficiary and acts solely on the beneficiary's behalf.
The beneficiary may withdraw or modify the trustee's authority at any
time. Indeed, there is not a single attribute of ownership, except title, which
does not rest in the beneficiary. The rights of creation, modification,
management, income and termination all belong to the beneficiary. In reality
the transfer to the trustee is a formality involving a shifting of legal
documents. The land trust, is, in fact, a fiction which has become en-
trenched in the law of this State and accepted as a useful instrument in
the handling of real estate transactions. Outside of relationships based on
legal title, the trustee's title has little significance.' 65
The court reasoned that the purpose of the revenue act was the collection
of taxes for benefits received, and thus concluded that imposition of tax
liability on the beneficiary, who received all the benefits of land ownership,
was appropriate.' 6
Due on Sale Clauses
Many mortgages contain "due on sale" clauses providing that the entire
amount remaining on the mortgage will be due if the mortgagor conveys,
or agrees to convey, the property. In a recent case, Wachta v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Association, '6 7 the mortgage contained a due on sale clause
that referred to conveyance of "title to the real estate." The land trust
beneficiary subject to this mortgage later assigned the beneficial interest. The
lender could not enforce the due on sale clause against the beneficiary
because, according to the court, an assignment of the beneficial interest was
not a conveyance.of title to the real estate.' 8 Although the court recited
the personal property and equitable title fictions,' 9 the underlying basis for
its decision was that the due on sale clause should be strictly construed against
the party who drew it up-the lender. " ' Strictly construing the due on sale
clause, the term "title" was thus limited to its ordinary meaning of legal title.
A slightly different situation was considered in Damen Savings and Loan
Association v. Heritage Standard Bank and Trust Co."' In that case, con-
veyance of the legal title into a land trust ocurred after the mortgage was
closed. This action was held sufficient to trigger a due on sale clause aimed
at both sale of the real estate and transfer of the title. " 2 The court did
not regard the due on sale clause, as construed, to be an unreasonable
restraint on alienation, even in light of the fact that the mortgagor would
165. Id. at 488-89, 492-93, 389 N.E.2d at 543-45.
166. Id. at 493, 389 N.E.2d at 546.
167. 103 Ill. App. 3d 174, 430 N.E.2d 708 (2d Dist. 1981).
168. Id. at 178, 430 N.E.2d at 712.
169. Id. at 181, 430 N.E.2d at 714.
170. Id. at 183, 430 N.E.2d at 716.
171. 103 111. App. 3d 301, 431 N.E.2d 34 (2d Dist. 1982).
172. Id. at 304, 431 N.E.2d at 36.
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continue to hold the beneficial interest.' 7 3 The Damen court reasoned that
the transfer of the title into the trust potentially impaired the lender's security
to the same extent as a transfer of the title to a third party. This was so
because the beneficial interest could subsequently be transferred without trig-
gering the due on sale clause. The clause would not be triggered because
such a transfer of the beneficial interest would be neither a transfer of title
nor a sale of the real estate.' The court added that, even if a subsequent
transfer of a beneficial interest triggered the clause, the lender would receive
no notice because transfers of the beneficial interest are not recorded, and
the clause would, therefore, be useless. 7 '
Legislative Enactments
The Illinois legislature has enacted several statutes which recite or other-
wise impact on the personal property fiction of land trusts.' 76 For example,
in 1963, the legislature passed a statute which required disclosure of land
trust beneficiaries to the building code enforcement authorities.' 7 Looking
beyond the personal property nature of a beneficiary's interest, this statute
realistically defines trust beneficiaries as those who have "present use and
enjoyment" of real property.' The Real Estate Transfer Tax Act,' 9 enacted
in 1967, describes a land trust trustee as "a mere repository of record legal
title with a duty of conveying the real estate only when and if directed in
writing by the ...beneficiaries . ... ,,o The implication of this language
is that the beneficiaries have a substantial interest in the real estate.
An Illinois statute enacted in 1969 requires disclosure of "the identity of
every owner and beneficiary having any interest, real or personal, in such
property" sold or leased to government agencies.'8 In the authors' view,
this language should not be interpreted as giving legislative credence to the
personal property fiction. Rather, at most, the statute merely acknowledges
the existence of trust agreements which assert a personal property interest
in the beneficiaries.
Another statute enacted in 1969 requires disclosure of the beneficiary when
land trust property is sold under real estate installment sales contracts.' 2
173. Id.
174. Id. But cf. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981)
(suggests an opposite result under such circumstances).
175. Damen, 103 11. App. at 304, 431 N.E.2d at 36.
176. See generally Note, Secret No More, supra note I (discussion of bills introduced into
Illinois General Assembly to address problems of land trust secrecy).
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 81(1) (1983).
178. Id. In part, the statute reads: "A trustee who pursuant to a trust instrument has title
to but no beneficial interest in real property .. . shall disclose the identity of every owner
and beneficiary . . . to the department .... Id.
179. Id. ch. 120, § 1003
180. Id.
181. Id. ch. 102, § 3.1.
182. Id. ch. 29, § 8.32.
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The statute defines a land trust as "any arrangement under which the title
. . . to real property, is held by a trustee and the interest of the beneficiary
is personal property [and] the beneficiary . . . has the exclusive power to
direct or control the trustee."' 8 3 This statute has been cited as a legislative
recognition of the personal property fiction." ' It could be construed just
as easily, however, as merely describing land trusts in the terms that are
customarily used in land trust agreements, rather than as legislatively defin-
ing the beneficial interest as personal property. Similarly descriptive sections,
also subject to the same interpretation, were included in a 1973 law that
requires disclosure of land trust beneficiaries by anyone applying for a govern-
ment license or permit relating to the trust real estate, 8' and in a 1981 amend-
ment to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. 86
A 1981 amendment to the Homestead Act that defines a homestead estate
as including "personal property" occupied as a residence'87 made no specific
reference to land trusts. The amendment could be interpreted as encompass-
ing homesteads which the owner labels as personal property, whether land
trust beneficial interests or mobile homes, without regard to whether the
homestead is, in fact, personal property.
In August 1982, legislation was enacted which allowed land trust trustees
to loan money to their beneficiaries while retaining the same rights on default
as any other secured creditor.' 8 This was a legislative reaction to Home
Federal Savings & Loan v. Zarkin, 189 which held that a trustee's fiduciary
obligations barred it from purchasing its own trust property at a foreclosure
sale. 9 The following language was included in the preamble to the legislation:
Disclosure [of owners of beneficial interests] was required by this legislature
in particular instances because the legislature recognized that the direction
and control of the real estate was in the hands of the beneficiaries because
the trustee acted solely as holder of the legal title and was subject at all
times to the direction and control of the beneficiaries ... '91
This language constitutes a legislative recognition that the beneficial in-
terest in a land trust is an equitable right to, and interest in, real estate.
Although the statute states further that " 'land trust' means any express
183. Id. § 8.31.
184. See, e.g., DiFoggio v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. 111. 1979); First Nat'l
Bank v. Oldenburg, 101 II1. App. 3d 283, 427 N.E.2d 1312 (2d Dist. 1981); In re Application
of County Treasurer (Spachman v. Overton), 16 111. App. 3d 385, 306 N.E.2d 743 (2d Dist. 1974).
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 71-73 (1983); see Note, Secret No More, supra note 1,
at 512-13.
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 /, § 201(l)(d) (1983).
187. Id. ch. 52, § 1.
188. Id. ch. 148, §§ 81-84.
189. 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
190. Id. at 240, 432 N.E.2d at 846; see supra text accompanying notes 151 & 152. The Il-
linois Supreme Court has since held that the retroactive application of this statute is unconstitu-
tional. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, No. 57935 (111. App. Ct. April 27, 1984).
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 81(1)(a)(3) (1983).
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agreement or arrangement .. .under which the interest of the beneficiary
is personal property only,"'9 2 the legislative purpose in using such language,
as in the earlier statutes previously discussed, could be construed as describ-
ing a typical land trust agreement which is subject to the act, rather than
as codifying the legal characteristics of a beneficial interest. The authors
conclude that while the Illinois legislature has recognized the existence of
land trust agreements in which the interest of the beneficiary is described
as personal property, it has not legislatively defined such interests as per-
sonal property.'9 3
Current Status of the Personal Property Fiction: Summation
The land trust personal property fiction seems to be losing judicial sup-
port, especially when the fiction is challenged by third persons whose claims
against beneficiaries are based on statutory rights against real estate owners.
After the supreme court's frank discussion of a land trust arrangement in
People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 94 very little vitality remains in the
personal property fiction under such circumstances. In addition to property
tax liability, the courts have held that land trust beneficiaries are the owners
of real estate or have an interest in real estate for determining dram shop
liability,'9 5 mechanics lien liability,'96 and compliance with the Recording
Act.' 97 It no longer seems tenable to argue that land trust beneficial interests
in Illinois are not interests in real estate with respect to third parties such
as judgment creditors who claim statutory rights based on such interests.'
Even in situations where the beneficiary has claimed a benefit intended
for real estate owners, recent decisions have allowed the beneficiary to con-
tradict his prior assertion of a personal property interest and thereby escape
the fiction. ' Moreover, the courts have routinely ignored the personal prop-
erty fiction in land trust cases when it has not been a direct issue in the
litigation."'
192. Id. § 82(2)(a).
193. For an example of a statute which for all purposes defines a beneficial interest as per-
sonal property, see FLA. STAT. § 689.071(4) (Supp. 1983).
194. See supra text accompanying note 165.
195. Robinson v. Walker, 63 I11. App. 2d 204, 211 N.E.2d 488 (1st Dist. 1965).
196. Dunlop v. McAtee, 31 111. App. 3d 56, 333 N.E.2d 76 (2d Dist. 1975). The court stated,
"The Illinois courts have repeatedly and consistently held that a holder of an equitable interest
in the land, including a beneficiary under a land trust, is an 'owner' within the meaning of
the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act, and we again so hold." Id. at 59, 333 N.E.2d at 78.
197. Bezin v. Ginsburg, 59 I11. App. 3d 429, 438, 375 N.E.2d 468, 476 (1st Dist. 1978).
198. Other examples not yet definitively litigated include substituted service of process on
a nonresident defendant owning the beneficial interest to land trust real estate in Illinois, see
Gordon v. Gordon, 6 Ill. 2d 572, 129 N.E.2d 706 (1955), and the prohibition against alien
ownership of Illinois real estate for a period of more than six years, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6,
§ 2 (1983). See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 153-62.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) ("properties owned
by various land trusts in which the defendant . . .had an equitable interest as beneficiary");
People v. Savaiano, 66 I11. 2d 7, 359 N.E.2d 475 (1976) (defendant beneficiary "purchased
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Furthermore, many benefits of land trusts are not dependent upon the
conversion of the beneficiary's real property interest to personal property.
The simplicity of beneficial interest assignments is not dependent upon the
legal nature of the beneficial interest as personal property, but upon the
less formal nature of the instrument and the continuity of record title in
the trustee. Real estate transfer taxes are imposed only on deeds," ° ' and
presumably would not attach to beneficial interest transfers, even if such
interests were considered real estate. The ease of title conveyance and the
insulation of the title from liens, claims, and charges against individual
beneficiaries do not stem from the characterization of the beneficiary's in-
terests as personal property, but rather from the separation of the beneficial
interest from the legal title; from the fact that the beneficial interest is not
recorded; 2U and from the placement of the legal title in the name of a trustee
who has full power to make title conveyances upon direction of less than
all of the beneficiaries. Avoidance of double taxation is related not to the
nature of the property interest, but to the nature of the ownership entity.
Protection against wrongful conveyances depends upon the trustee's legal
title to the assets, rather than their real or personal characteristics. Immunity
of land trust beneficiaries from partition results either from a partnership
relation or from an agreement not to partition, not from the personal prop-
erty representations.2 0 3 The utility of a trust to avoid probate, whether
domestic or ancillary, does not depend upon a conversion of beneficial in-
terests from real to personal property as long as the trust agreement designates
a remainder beneficiary. The trustee adjusts his records upon satisfactory
proof of death without the intervention of probate.20 Also, since the aboli-
tion of dower, spousal rights in decedents' estates are not affected by the
nature of the property interest as real or personal. In cases regarding gift
tax liability on transfers of fractional beneficial interests, the personal pro-
perty question is once again not an issue. Instead, the issue is whether the
donee receives a present or future interest. 05
20 acres of land," had "ownership of realty" .. . "owned land" ... had an "interest in
the land"); Lake City Corp. v. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank, 33 Il. App. 3d 100, 337 N.E.2d
251 (lst Dist. 1975) (a beneficiary "filed suit, asking for the return of its real estate"); Ellis
Realty v. Chapelski, 28 II1. App. 3d 1008, 329 N.E.2d 370 (1st Dist. 1975) (beneficiary had
"equitable ownership" of the property); City of Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 Ill. App.
2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1969) (defendant beneficiary was "the real title holder" and
had "ownership in the properties").
201. See supra note 37.
202. See, e.g., Chicago Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 111. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d
670 (1962) (federal tax lien which attached to the beneficial interest of a land trust was destroyed
by a subsequent legal title mortgage by the trustee to a bona fide purchaser who was without
knowledge of the beneficiary's interest).
203. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
204. On the death of a life tenant, whether under a legal life estate or a trust, interest does
not pass to his executor or administrator but goes directly to the remainderman. Chicago Title
v. Colby, 297 Ill. App. 176, 17 N.E.2d 350 (1938); Nott v. Heitman Trust, 285 111. App. 450,
2 N.E.2d 143 (1936).
205. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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The personal property fiction is also irrelevant to the making of mortgage
loans that impose no personal liability on the borrower. Whether personal
liability exists depends upon whether the parties contracted that there be
such liability.2"6 In order, however, for a borrower to obtain a loan on real
estate by giving up the traditional real estate mortgage rights of judicial
foreclosure and redemption, it is essential that he assert a personal property
interest in the security pledged." 7
Immunity of land trust beneficial interests from judgment liens is a direct
consequence of classifying the beneficial interest as personal property rather
than as real estate. As discussed earlier, however, there is serious doubt about
the soundness of the legal theories underlying the rule that land trust
beneficial interests are personal property for purposes of the judgment lien
statute; furthermore, this rule leads to results contrary to public policy. 0
It thus appears that the land trust personal property fiction is of con-
siderably less significance than is commonly assumed. If legislation were
enacted that specified the circumstances under which real estate mortgages
could be made without the rights of judicial foreclosure and redemption,
the utility of the fiction in circumstances consistent with public policy would
virtually disappear.
WHY NOT CHOOSE A LAND TRUST?
Disadvantages to Beneficiaries
The benefits of land trusts to real estate owners should be weighed both
against the cost of legal and trustee fees incurred in the creation and ad-
ministration of the trusts and against certain disadvantages of owning a
beneficial interest. Some of these disadvantages are directly related to the
fact that the beneficiary's interest is not recorded. For example, a beneficiary
has no right to notice of a real estate tax deed proceeding. 9 He is not
considered a necessary party to a real estate mortgage foreclosure," ' real
estate condemnation suit,"' suit to quiet title,2"2 mechanics lien proceeding," '
206. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
209. See First Lien Co. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 56 I11. 2d 132, 306 N.E.2d 23 (1973);
In re Application of County Treasurer (Winnetka Inv. Co. v. Fried), 113 111. App. 2d 50,
251 N.E.2d 757 (lst Dist. 1969).
210. See Marshall v. Solomon, 335 111. App. 302, 309, 81 N.E.2d 777, 781 (2d Dist. 1948).
211. See Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. Darrow, 12 Ill. 2d 365, 146 N.E.2d 1 (1957);
Chicago N. Sh. & M.R.R. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 328 Ill. 610, 160 N.E. 226 (1928);
Department of Conservation v. Franzen, 43 11. App. 3d 374, 356 N.E.2d 1245 (2d Dist. 1976).
212. See Crawford Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Woodlawn Trust & Sav. Bank, 382 I11. 354,
47 N.E.2d 81 (1943).
213. The sale of property to satisfy the lien is authorized under the Mechanics Lien Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 14 (1983). Because the lien is directed at the title of the property,
the beneficiary is not a necessary party to the litigation. Lipavsky v. 16th St. Bldg. Corp.,
267 111. App. 85, 89 (1st Dist. 1932); cf. Case Int'l Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
18 I11. App. 3d 297, 309 N.E.2d 750 (1st Dist. 1974) (the trustee is a necessary party).
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or partition action.2 4 He also cannot avail himself of an "exculpatory clause"
in favor of the lessor in a lease executed by the trustee at the beneficiary's
direction. 2 ' Moreover, an undisclosed beneficiary is statutorily barred from
the right to redeem at a tax sale.2 6
In a number of instances, the intent of beneficiaries can be frustrated by
procedural and technical errors despite the absence of any real ambiguity.
In a will or testamentary direction to the trustee, for example, a beneficiary
cannot refer to the beneficial interest as "real estate.""' Nor can he accept
an offer to purchase the property if the offer was directed to the trustee;2 18
contract to sell the property as "owner" thereof;" 9 execute a lease as "agent"
of the trustee; 2  or sue to enforce a lease executed by the trustee. 2 '
Under some circumstances, when the beneficial interest of a land trust
of Illinois real estate is owned by a nonresident decedent, the beneficial in-
terest may be subject to inheritance taxes both in the state of residence and
in Illinois. 2 2 Also, the title of the assignee of a beneficial interest is subject
to numerous infirmities and hazards that may be avoided by taking record
title to the real estate. This is compounded by the fact that title insurance
may not always be available to assignees of a beneficial interest.223
Finally, a potentially significant disadvantage is that standard land trust
agreements contain sweeping exculpatory clauses that exempt the trustee from
any liability arising out of the administration of the trust.2 ' If the courts
were to uphold such clauses, the trustee could wrongfully dispose of the
property, leaving the beneficiary with no recourse.
214. See Kaiserman v. Ellenson, 17 Ill. App. 3d 923, 308 N.E.2d 813 (4th Dist. 1974).
215. See Koehler v. Southmoor Bank & Trust Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 195, 201, 189 N.E.2d
22, 25 (1st Dist. 1963).
216. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (1983). The statute states, "no redemption shall
be held invalid by reason of the failure of the person redeeming to have an interest of record
in the property redeemed, other than undisclosed beneficiaries of Illinois land trusts." Id.
217. Favata v. Favata, 74 I11. App. 3d 979, 394 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979).
218. First Nat'l Bank v. Oldenburg, 101 I11. App. 3d 283, 427 N.E.2d 1312 (2d Dist. 1981);
Schneider v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank, 26 111. App. 2d 463, 168 N.E.2d 808 (1st Dist. 1960).
219. Madigan v. Buehr, 125 I11. App. 2d 8, 260 N.E.2d 431 (lst Dist. 1970).
220. Seaberg v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 I11. App. 3d 1066, 342 N.E.2d 751
(1st Dist. 1976); Feinberg v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 131 111. App. 2d 1087, 266 N.E.2d
401 (1st Dist. 1970).
221. Jakovljevich v. Alvarez, 113 Ill. App. 2d 302, 252 N.E.2d 60 (1st Dist. 1969).
222. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 7.15, at 18.
223. See id. §§ 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.45, 5.50.
224. A typical exculpatory clause follows:
It is further understood and agreed that neither
& Trust Co. of Chicago individually or as Trustee, nor its successor or successors
in trust shall incur any personal liability or be subjected to any claim, judgment
or decree for anything it or they or its or their agents or attorneys may do or
omit to do in or about the said real estate or under the provisions of said deed
or deeds in trust or this Trust Agreement, or any amendment thereof, or for injury
to person or property happening in or about said real estate, any and all such
liability being hereby expressly waived and released.
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Disadvantages to the Public
The prevalence of secret land trusts makes it obvious that real estate owners
find them useful and convenient. This does not mean, however, that secret
ownership of real estate is socially appropriate or consistent with sound public
policy. Although judicial commentary on either the benefits or detriments
of land trust secrecy has been sparse, 25 it is the authors' opinion that scrutiny
of many of the alleged benefits of secret ownership reveals that those benefits,
with the exception of financial privacy, are contrary to the public interest.
Landlords might better fulfill their obligations to tenants if tenants could
contact them directly with grievances regarding rent increases, failure to main-
tain the building, and failure to provide utilities.226 If an owner is known
to his tenants, he might take more pride in management and upkeep of the
property he owns." 7 Moreover, improved landlord-tenant communication
might lessen the need for increased governmental regulation to vindicate
tenants' rights.
Property owners may be less likely to violate building codes or zoning
ordinances if they are under the direct scrutiny of the tenants, neighbors,
225. In Lambos v. Lambos, 9 Ill. App. 3d 530, 292 N.E.2d 587 (1st Dist. 1972), the appellate
court found that the settlors had created the trust "so that with little inconvenience to them
they could enjoy its proceeds during their lifetime. In fact, these are the advantages of an
lllinois land trust." Id. at 534, 292 N.E.2d at 590. Presumably the court was talking about
secrecy. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5. In Schneider v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank,
26 11. App. 2d 463, 466, 168 N.E.2d 808, 809 (1st Dist. 1960), the court noted that secrecy
was an advantage and benefit to land trust beneficiaries. In Hanley v. Kusper, 61 Il1. 2d 452,
337 N.E.2d 1 (1975), the court stated:
There is no doubt that a trust is an artificial legal device by which some of the
consequences that would ordinarily attach to the ownership of property by a natural
person may be avoided. The objective . . . may be in part to conceal actual owner-
ship, as in the case of the land trust.
Id. at 461, 337 N.E.2d at 6 (citing G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 250 (1971)).'The BOGERT
reference cited by the court simply lists secrecy as among the advantages accruing to settlors
and beneficiaries of land trusts. The Illinois Supreme Court has commented that "the land
trust has, over the years, served as a useful vehicle in real estate transactions for maintaining
secrecy of ownership and allowing ease of transfer. Despite [limited disclosure statutes], the
land trust remains a widely utilized and useful device." People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
75 Ill. 2d 479, 487, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1979).
226. Slum buildings with numerous code violations or in a state of disrepair are often the
object of litigation which arises out of those conditions. See Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n
v. Darrow, 12 11. 2d 365, 146 N.E.2d 1 (1957) (suit to condemn 23 parcels of land held in
secret land trust for slum clearance); King v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 64 Ill. App. 3d 335, 381
N.E.2d 356 (1st Dist. 1978) (suit for damages arising from fire in building maintained in poor
condition).
227. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa. 578, 580,
252 A.2d 622, 624 (1969) (tenants permitted to picket residence of landlord because of landlord's
secret methods of doing business); see also Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, I N.M.L.
REV., 28-37 (1971); Whitman, Secrecy and Real Property, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 251, 251-252
& n.3 (1978); Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law and Operation in the State and Nation, 23
U. FLA. L. REV. 79, 96-97 (1970).
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and community organizations in building and zoning controversies."' Time-
consuming, expensive, and sometimes ineffective government intervention will
be virtually unnecessary if corrective action can be taken as a result of in-
formal discussion among the parties.
Prospective purchasers of land can make a more accurate appraisal of
the property's value if they can gain direct access to the seller rather than
being forced to rely upon secondhand, and possibly incomplete, representa-
tions of the seller's broker. 2 9 Furthermore, in the event of fraud or nonper-
formance, knowledge of the seller's identity can facilitate the buyer's recourse
against him after the closing.23
The rights of individual property owners would appear to be abused when
a major developer or corporation, attempting to assemble a large tract of
land, by concealing its initial purchases acquires the remaining property from
owners who would have demanded a higher price had they known the iden-
tity of the buyer.23 Secrecy of ownership thereby tilts the market in favor
of the buyer by denying vital information to the seller,232 resulting in a sort
of condemnation by deception. For the free market system to function
effectively traders must have full information about all factors that may affect
prices. If a situation arises in which the public interest in the economic
benefits associated with real estate development requires a land owner to
sell his property to a developer at a "fair market" price, the appropriate
procedure would be to extend to the developer the power of eminent domain
similar to that accorded to urban renewal authorities. 23 3 The property owner
228. An example of how secret land trusts can be used to delay and frustrate enforcement
of building regulations is found in City of Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 Ill. App. 2d
39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (lst Dist. 1969). In Hart, the City of Chicago filed numerous suits against
various corporations to force them to correct building code violations. The court appointed
a receiver to take control of the property and, pursuant to court order, to correct the viola-
tions. The receiver, meanwhile, purchased the property under a secret land trust agreement.
Later, when the court suspected a breach by the receiver of its fiduciary relationship to the
court, he refused to cooperate with the court in its request for disclosure of ownership. The
receiver was eventually held in contempt of court. For an excellent description of slumlord
abuses concealed by land trusts, see Top Slumlords Unmasked, Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1973,
at 1, col. 4.
229. See Whitman, supra note 227, at 254.
230. Recourse against the seller involves identification, location, and service of process. These
steps are made more difficult, and the buyer's chances of recovery are lessened, when a secret
land trust is used to effect the sale. Whitman, supra note 227, at 259.
231. See W. GARRETT, LAND TRUSTS 6 (1971) [hereinafter W. GARRETT]; Note, Secret No
More, supra note 1, at 510 n.5; see also Whitman, supra note 227, at 253 n.6. Whitman discussed
the "classic illustration" of the assemblage of land, involving the town of Columbia, Md.,
during the early 1960's. Despite the developer's use of many undisclosed agents to buy the
land, however, the purchase prices of the last-obtained parcels were much higher than those
of the first purchases. Id.
232. See Whitman, supra note 227, at 258 (identity of land owner can be relevant to free
market debate).
233. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. The Court stated
that it was constitutional for urban renewal authorities to take appellant's building and land
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would then have the benefit of the procedural safeguards in legal condem-
nation actions, and could not later claim he was deceived into selling his
property for less than what it was worth.
Secrecy of ownership makes it difficult to determine the extent to which
condominiums are being acquired for investment and rental or resale pur-
poses rather than for individual home ownership.1 4 To the extent that the
acquisition of condominiums is being used for investment purposes, the major
purpose behind condominiums, which is promoting and encouraging home
ownership, is not being fulfilled. Also, secret ownership of condominiums
hinders the condominium association's enforcement of timely payment of
dues, assessments, and other obligations of unit owners.
Secret land trusts are also convenient for those speculators who prey on
fear and ignorance to acquire property at depressed prices and resell at a
large profit. One example is seen in racially changing neighborhoods. In these
neighborhoods whites are panicked into selling at below-market prices and
blacks are willing to pay a premium for better housing."'
Certainly it is not in the public interest for secrecy of land ownership to
be used to frustrate valid rezoning efforts. Yet, owners of property zoned
for highrise buildings have consistently opposed community efforts to have
the property rezoned to control undesirable increases in density. Secret land
trusts enable those owners to escape neighborhood scrutiny and
accountability. 23 6
Secret ownership of real estate in land trusts hampers attachment creditors
from discovering debtors' property, 37 delays judgment creditors in subjec-
ting debtors' property to the satisfaction of judgments,"' and facilitates
transfers of mortgaged property, in violation of the "due on sale" clause
contained in many mortgages.239 It has been the law in Illinois for many
under the power of eminent domain, pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the redevelopment
of a large area of the District of Columbia. Id. at 34-35. Condemnation of property for this
purpose is considered a valid exercise of the state's police power, aimed at improving the public
welfare. Id. at 33; see also Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) (con-
demnation power properly exercised to redistribute land from large estate). Similarly, extending
the power of eminent domain to land developers in order to provide for the public welfare
should be an acceptable exercise of the police power.
234. See Condomania in Chicago, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1978, at 56-57.
235. Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § 2, at 1.
236. Campaign to Control High Rises, Lakeview Citizens Council, Chicago, Jan. 30, 1975.
237. An attachment creditor is "[olne who has caused an attachment to be issued and levied
on the property of his debtor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (5th ed. 1979). Attachments
are issued prior to judgment, before the creditor has a chance to interrogate the debtor about
his assets. Hence the creditor must know what assets the debtor owns.
238. A judgment creditor is "folne who has obtained a judgment against his debtor, under
which he can enforce execution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (5th ed. 1979). Even if a
judgment or execution is effective as a lien, the creditor can expedite actual satisfaction if
he can identify the property without the need for supplementary discovery proceedings. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1402 (1983).
239. See Damen Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Heritage Bank, 103 Il. App. 3d 301, 431 N.E.2d
34 (2d Dist. 1982). An assigment of a beneficial interest in a land trust will not activate a
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years that a conveyance on a secret trust for the benefit of the grantor is
a fraud on creditors.4 0 Such conveyances should not be encouraged.
Because of land trust secrecy, persons with claims against property owners
concealed by land trusts must first file suit against the trustee to ascertain
the identity of the beneficiaries." Thus, there is no opportunity for infor-
mal settlement prior to litigation. When the trustee appears in court to disclose
the owner, a summons must then be served on the beneficiary. The result
is unnecessary delay and expense imposed on both litigants and the court
system.
Secret ownership facilitates avoidance of property taxes by shielding prop-
erty owners who repurchase, usually at a bargain price, their own tax-
delinquent property at "scavenger" sales.2"2 Elements of organized crime have
found secret land trusts to be a convenient device for concealing their ac-
tivities from law enforcement agencies and the public. 3 Aliens have utilized
the land trust device to achieve secrecy and in so doing have avoided the
six year time limit imposed on alien ownership of real property in Illinois.2"'
Lastly, public officials have utilized secret land trusts to conceal real estate
transactions that would be subject to criticism because of conflicts of
interest.24 '
"due on sale" clause unless the clause is written very specifically to extend to all interests.
See H. KENOE, supra note I, § 6.38, at 66. But see Williams v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n, 500 F.Supp 307 (E.D. Va. 1980) (use of land trust to avoid "due on sale" clause will
not succeed).
240. See McKey v. Cochran, 262 Ill. 376, 384, 104 N.E. 693, 696 (1914); Bostwick v. Blake,
145 Ill. 85, 34 N.E. 38 (1893); Franceschi v. Franceschi, 326 I11. App. 494, 62 N.E.2d I (2d
Dist. 1945).
241. In tort litigation involving a secret land trust, suit is initially filed against the trustee
since it is the legal title holder of record. The trustee is a party to the litigation only so long
as necessary to reveal the beneficiary. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 6.12, at 17.
242. See Johnson, Personal View, Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at 44, col. 1.
243. See, e.g., Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 5, col. 1, Sept. 13, 1983, at 30, col.
2 (El Rukn gang); Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 7, 1980, at 36, col. 4 (arson); Chicago Sun-Times,
June 10, 1977, at 3, col. 1 (pornographic literature distribution). Several land trusts were outlawed
in Arizona after revelation of major abuses by criminal elements, culminating in the murder
of a newspaper reporter. See NEW YORK, Sept. 6, 1976, at 39; Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25,
1977, at 3, col. I.
244. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1, 2 (1983); see Allen, Jr. & Olaussen, Problem Areas Con-
cerning Foreign Investment in Real Estate, 61 CHI. B. REC. 263, 265 (1980). Moreover, this
time restriction does not apply to alien acquisition of personal property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
6, § 7 (1983); see also Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat.
1450 (1974) (national concern over foreign investment in United States). See generally Note,
Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate: Xenophobic or Principled Reaction?,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 491 (1976) (discussing recent foreign investments in United State real estate,
as well as state and federal regulation of investments).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (documenting former
Chicago Alderman Thomas E. Keane's involvement with secret land trusts); People v. Saviano,
66 Il. 2d 7, 359 N.E.2d 475 (1976); Note, Secret No More, supra note 1, at 511 n.10; Royko,
Our Mr. Fastbuck, Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 26, 1982, at 2, col. 1, Apr. 13, 1982, at 2, col.
1, July 12, 1983, at 19, col. I (Alderman and Cook County Democratic Chairman Edward
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Defenders of secret ownership of real estate argue that investors should
have the same right of financial privacy with regard to their real estate
holdings as they do in ownership of other personal property, such as stocks
and bonds.246 Such a claim has some viability. The public's interest in know-
ing who owns a given parcel of land, however, must take precedence over
an owner's desire for financial privacy. Abuses in the ownership and use
of land can cause injury to both individuals and the surrounding
community.247
If secrecy were abolished, it is quite possible that other legal devices, such
as corporations, limited partnerships, nominees, or conventional trusts, would
be used for the same purposes. Unlike the trustee of a land trust, however,
a corporation, partnership, nominee, or ordinary trustee can be held legally
responsible for the property.2"8 Furthermore, the identity of corporate direc-
tors, general partners, nominees, and trustees is more readily accessible to
the public than is the identity of secret land trust beneficiaries.
Perhaps the clearest indication that secret ownership is against the public
interest can be found in recent legislation aimed at minimizing the cir-
cumstances in which such secrecy will be tolerated. In 1972 the legislature
amended the tax sale redemption statute to exclude undisclosed beneficiaries
of land trusts from the category of persons entitled to redeem at tax sales.24 9
The Internal Revenue Service requires all land trustees to notify the IRS
of the establishment and termination of land trusts and of each transfer
of beneficial interests.25 The legislature has responded to complaints about
land trust secrecy abuses by requiring limited disclosure of beneficiaries to
certain parties, primarily government agencies, under certain circumstances."
R. Vrdolyak); Chicago Sun-Times, June 15, 1980, at 3, col. I (Alderman Edward R. Vrdolyak);
Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 6, 1973, at 1, col.1 (former Chief Circuit Judge John S. Boyle);
Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § IA, at 4, col. 2 (former Illinois Secretary of State John
W. Lewis).
246. See H. KENOE, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 5. Professor Kenoe states that:
On principle there seems to be no reason why real estate ownership should be more
a matter of public record than ownership of bank accounts or corporate stocks
or bonds. The characterization of the land trust as a 'secret trust' seems to convey
a sinister connotation which would be equally applicable to a 'secret bank account.'
Id.; see also W. GARRETT, supra note 231, at 6.
247. See Note, Secret No More, supra note I, at 510.
248. A corporation has the capacity to sue and can be sued in its corporate name. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, §157.5(b) (1983). In a limited partnership, all general partners are jointly and
severally liable for the actions of the partnership. Id. ch. 106 2, §15(a). An ordinary trustee
is liable because its holding of the title to the trust property is the same as if it owned the
property absolutely. G. BOGERT, supra note 7, at 341.
249. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (1983).
250. I.R.C. § 6903(b) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 301.6903-1(a)(b) (1954).
251. Examples of legislative response to complaints about land trust secrecy include: (1) for
real estate being sold under installment contracts, disclosure to purchasers is required, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 29, §§ 8.31, 8.32 (1983), (2) for property included in applications for low-cost in-
surance in urban areas, disclosure to the Insurance Industry Placement Facility is required,
id. ch. 73, § 1065.72-4(2), (3) for buildings in violation of health or safety regulations, disclosure
19841
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The limited disclosure required by these statutes is a step in the right direc-
tion, but it falls short of what is necessary in the public interest." 2 Govern-
ment agencies are often handicapped by procedural red tape, inadequate staff
resources, and bureaucratic inertia. The present statutes are of little or no
help in vindicating tenants' and creditors' rights, providing full information
both to noninstallment buyers and to sellers, controlling undesirable specula-
tion, or identifying criminal and alien real estate ownership. There is no
substitute for direct access to ownership information by those individual
citizens who are adversely affected by the acts or omissions of land trust
real estate owners.
Land trusts are contrary to the public interest not only because of secrecy,
but in several other respects as well. Land trust trustees, for example, as
previously discussed, are immune from tort liability and property taxes and
are not responsible for compliance with applicable statutes and ordinances." 3
Avoidance of real estate transfer taxes and of proper reassessment for prop-
erty tax purposes deprives state and local governments of badly needed
revenue and shifts the tax burden from affluent commercial real estate owners
onto individual homeowners who do not use land trusts.
To the extent that insulation of estates from claims of surviving spouses
is a factor in the use of land trusts in estate planning, it seems contrary
to the public policy objective of the Probate Act25 ' which is to assure that
surviving spouses are provided for regardless of the wishes of the decedent.
Also, use of land trusts to insulate the beneficiary from judgment liens is
contrary to longstanding Illinois public policy favoring satisfaction of
judgments and making real estate subject to the claims of creditors. 5
Finally, to the extent that permitting borrowers to waive their rights to
judicial foreclosure and redemption of mortgaged property is consistent with
the public interest, they should not be compelled to pay a fee to a land
trustee in order to do so, nor have to engage in the deceptive act of labelling
their real estate as personal property.
to building code enforcement agencies upon notice of complaint is required. With regard to
residential buildings in violation of the regulations, disclosure to the public is necessary 180
days after disclosure to the agency, if violation has not been corrected, id. ch. 80, § 81, (4)
for buildings damaged or destroyed by fire, disclosure to arson investigators is necessary, id.
§ 81.1; id. ch. 127 2, § 8, (5) for real estate being sold or leased to government agencies,
disclosure to the agency is required, id. ch. 102, § 3.1, (6) for real estate subject to real estate
transfer tax (nonresident of Illinois beneficiaries only), disclosure to the Department of Revenue
is required, id. ch. 120, § 1003, (7) for real estate involved in applications to government agen-
cies for licenses, permits, or benefits, disclosure to the agency is required, id. ch. 148, § 72.
The legislature is presently considering a bill to require beneficiary disclosure of land trust
real estate acquired by the Chicago World's Fair Authority. Chicago Sun-Times, June 8, 1984,
at 22, col. 5.
252. See Note, Secret No More, supra note 1, at 512.
253. See supra notes 15, 16, & 37 and accompanying text.
254. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 /2, § 2-8 (1983).
255. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Some Advantages Not Dependent on
Land Trust Arrangement
Some of the proclaimed advantages of land trusts can accrue as a matter
of law in some situations without the need for any kind of trust. Partner-
ships obtain the benefits of simplified assignment transfers of beneficial in-
terests, simplified legal title conveyances, and avoidance of impairment of
legal title through the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act256 or by
agreement of the partners. A partnership, like a trust, is not ordinarily sub-
ject to double income taxation. Moreover, any association facing this threat
may file an election under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code257
to be taxed as a partnership. Partnerships may prevent wrongful transfers
by limiting an individual partner's apparent authority to make conveyances.
Partnership property cannot be partitioned.258
Wrongful transfers in real estate sales contract situations can be prevented
by either recording the contract, placing the real estate in escrow, or doing
both. Non-partnership multiple ownership real estate can be immunized from
partition by a simple agreement among the owners.259 Finally, parties to a
mortgage loan may contract that no personal liability will be incurred, without
the necessity of setting up a trust.2 60
CONCLUSION: SOME REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
In light of the foregoing discussion, one approach to land trusts would
be to absolutely abolish them by subjecting them to the Statute of Uses. 2 6 1
The result would be that in every instance in which a land trust was created,
full legal title would immediately vest in the beneficiary.Application of the
Statute of Uses to the land trust problem, however, is not necessary. Nominee
256. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 V2, §§ 1-73 (1983). For example, partnership interests may be
freely transferred by assignment. Such assignments do not dissolve the partnership and do not
disturb the title to partnership real estate, which may be placed in the name of the partnership
rather than that of the individual partners. Id. ch. 106 2, § 27. The partners may agree in
advance that assignees acquire full partnership rights and status. Additionally, conveyances of
legal title to partnership real estate may be simplified by appointing a managing partner to
make conveyances. The record title to partnership realty is specifically protected against pro-
blems of individual partners, such as death, incompetency, judgments. Id. § 25. Claims and
liens against individual partners do not affect the title to partnership real estate. The partner-
ship agreement may specify that death and other problems of individual partners will not cause
a dissolution of the partnership requiring a transfer of legal title, 29 ILLINoIs LAW AND PRAC-
TICE Partnership §§ 211, 220 (1957).
257. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1983).
258. Whitaker v. Scherrer, 313 Ill. 473, 145 N.E. 177 (1924); see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 2,
§ 25 (1983).
259. 29 ILLINoIs LAW AND PRACTICE Partition §§ 20, 21 (1957).
260. Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321 (1927); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 774 (1944).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 3 (1983). The statute does not presently apply to land trusts.
See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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or title-holding trusts are not an evil per se. Furthermore, even if the Statute
of Uses were strictly applied to current standard land trust agreements, the
statute might subsequently be avoided by including additional ministerial
duties to be performed by the trustee. 6 2 Specific problems of land trusts
would be better dealt with by the following specific remedies.
First, all land trust trustees should be required to disclose, to any person
so requesting, the name and address of all beneficiaries and holders of the
power of direction. Support for disclosure has come from public leaders
who speak on behalf of the public's interest in having ready access to this
information. During his visit to Chicago in July 1966, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. called for public disclosure of secret land trust beneficiaries.2 63 It
is well past time to achieve this goal.
Second, to the extent that beneficiaries and holders of the power of direc-
tion are not required to be disclosed, land trust trustees should be held jointly
liable with beneficiaries for torts, property taxes, obligations toward tenants,
and compliance with statutes and ordinances applicable to the trust real estate.
Justification for this requirement lies in the fact that the land trust trustee
is the owner of record of the property and earns a profit in his capacity
as trustee.
Third, land trust beneficial interests should be considered interests in real
estate for purposes of the judgment lien statute and all other statutes con-
ferring rights against real estate interests to third parties whose claims are
not grounded on the trust agreement or assisted through the parties to the
agreement. Landowners should not be able to escape judgment liens and
other such claims through payment of trustee fees. Avoidance of valid liens
and claims through the use of land trusts was a result obviously not con-
templated by the legislature when it enacted the statutes.
Fourth, a surviving spouse should have the right to claim a statutory share
against any assets placed by the decedent in a land trust.
Fifth, the real estate transfer tax laws should be interpreted or amended
to apply to transfers by assignments of land trust beneficial interests to the
same extent as to transfers by deeds filed for record.
Sixth, the law on mortgage foreclosures and redemptions should be re-
vised to reflect public policy goals regardless of the legal device employed.
Perhaps sound public policy should allow private sales without the right of
redemption for any mortgaged property other than homesteads. Conversely,
homestead owners should have the present protection regardless of whether
their property is in a land trust.
The Illinois State Bar Association tells us correctly that "the legal system
should function in a manner that commands public respect." '264 In inter-
preting the land trust, judges and lawyers have told the people of Illinois
262. See generally H. KENOE, supra note 1, §§ 1.20, at 15-18, 8.17, at 86-87.
263. Chicago Sun-Times, July 12, 1966, at 30, col. 1.
264. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1980).
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that what in fact is real estate is, in law, personal property. Such a doctrine
erodes respect for the law and legal institutions. Quite apart from substan-
tive public policy issles, the law should not lie; it should say what it means
and mean what it says.

